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High-Speed Trading on Stock and
Commodity Markets—From Courier
Pigeons to Computers

JERRY W. MARKHAM*

The success of a speculator depends on the accuracy of his estimates, and it
follows that where we find organized speculation we find the best perfected
facilities for securing early and accurate information. This is one of the striking
merits of the speculative system. In any business, knowledge and foresight are
the chief requisites of success. Nowhere do we find such strenuous efforts in this
direction as among large speculators. It may be said with scarcely an exception
that every successful operator in the stock or grain market has been distinguished
by his unusual success in securing accurate information in advance of his
competitors.
With this body of keen experts, striving by the use of private wires, special agents
and every other means, to discover and foresee every event bearing on values,
speculation has been well defined as the struggle of well-equipped intelligence
against the rough power of chance.
—Henry Crosby Emery, 18961

*
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1. Henry Crosby Emery, Speculation on the Stock and Produce Exchanges of the
United States, in 7 STUDIES IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC LAW 116–17 (Faculty of
Political Sci. of Colum. Univ. eds., 1896) (footnotes omitted).
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I. ABSTRACT
A growing concern in the stock and commodity markets over the last
several years has been the rise of high-frequency traders (HFTs).2 Those
traders employ high-speed computer technology for the algorithmic
origination, transmission and execution of their orders through fiber optic
cables and microwave towers. That technology allows HFT orders to be
executed in times measured in fractions of a second. As a result of this
technological advance, HFTs are now dominating trading volumes. This
phenomenon has, on the one hand, led to claims by proponents of highspeed trading that HFTs are an important source of market liquidity and
should not be subject to burdensome regulation. Critics of HFTs, on the
other hand, are claiming that high-speed trading is abusive and disruptive
for other traders. Those critics also claim that HFTs use their high-speed
advantage to trade in advance of other customers and that HFTs should be
regulated in a manner that will remove their advantages. This Article will
show that concern over informational advantages of traders through “high
2. Although this article focuses on electronic trading in the stock and commodity
markets, bond trading has also begun a migration to electronic trading platforms. See
Nathaniel Popper, Shouts on Bond-Trading Floor Yield to Robot Beeps, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
19, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/19/shouts-on-bond-trading-floor-yield
to-robot-beeps/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/DW9S-PA49]; see also
Tara Bhupathi, Comment, Technology’s Latest Market Manipulator? High Frequency
Trading: The Strategies, Tools, Risks, and Response, 11 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 377, 385–91
(2010) (discussing the modern technologies of trading markets).
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speed” communications is not a new phenomenon. Such advantages have
historically been employed through communication methods that have
included fast sailing ships, courier pigeons, stagecoaches, smoke signals,
semaphore flags, flashing mirrors, the telegraph, and the telephone. This
article will also show how computerized high-speed trading transformed
the stock and commodity markets from inefficient open outcry auctions
to more efficient electronic trading platforms in which HFTs play an
important role. The article concludes that HFTs are simply a continuation
of market advances and that efforts to slow down HFTs are misguided.
II. INTRODUCTION: HIGH-SPEED TRADING CONCERNS
A growing concern in the stock and commodity markets over the last
several years has been the rise of high-frequency traders (HFTs).3 HFTs
seek advantage over other traders through the use of algorithmic trading
programs that execute orders through high-speed fiber optic cables,
microwaves, and even lasers.4 The speed of HFT order entry and execution
is further enhanced by the “co-location” of their computer servers at
3. The Securities and Exchange Commission has noted that:
One of the most significant market structure developments in recent years is high
frequency trading (HFT). The term is relatively new and is not yet clearly defined.
It typically is used to refer to professional traders acting in a proprietary capacity
that engage in strategies that generate a large number of trades on a daily basis.
These traders could be organized in a variety of ways, including as a proprietary
trading firm (which may or may not be a registered broker-dealer and member
of FINRA), as the proprietary trading desk of a multi-service broker-dealer, or
as a hedge fund . . . .
Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Exchange Act Release No. 34–61358, 75
Fed. Reg. 3594, 3606 (proposed Jan. 21, 2010). See generally e.g., SCOTT PATTERSON,
THE QUANTS 309 (2010) (describing the development of HFTs).
4. An advisory committee created by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
identified the following as attributes of a HFT:
(a) Algorithms for decision making, order initiation, generation, routing, or
execution, for each individual transaction without human direction;
(b) low-latency technology that is designed to minimize response times,
including proximity and co-location services;
(c) high speed connections to markets for order entry; and
(d) recurring high message rates (orders, quotes or cancellations) determined
using one or more objective forms of measurement, including (i) cancel-to
fill ratios; (ii) participant-to-market message ratios; or (iii) participant-to
market trade volume ratios.
Concept Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated Trading
Environments, 78 Fed. Reg. 56,542, 56,545 (proposed Sept. 12, 2013) (footnote omitted)
[hereinafter Risk Controls and System Safeguards].
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specially built exchange facilities.5 These communication advantages
allow HFTs to shave microseconds off trade origination and execution
times, providing advantage over traders that do not have such high-speed
capabilities.6
As will be described below, the quest for “high-speed” trading advantages
is not a new phenomenon. High-speed traders in earlier centuries employed
communication mediums that were faster than the norm at the time.7 Such
devices have included fast sailing ships, courier pigeons, express coaches,
smoke and hand signals, semaphore flags, mirrors, the telegraph, and private
telephone lines.8 Those advances in communication initially benefitted
individual speculators who were the first to employ them, but concerns
were voiced that those “high-speed” traders were taking advantage of
slower speed market participants.9 There was, however, another side of
5. Senator John McCain (R. Ariz) described co-location as follows:
Another key tactic used by high-frequency trading firms is co-location. This
practice involves trading firms literally renting space for their computers in the
same room as the computers that run the stock exchanges so that they can receive
market information directly from the exchanges’ computers as fast as possible.
The investors that don’t buy this direct connection to the exchanges receive
market data via a government-established system using out-of-date technology
called the Securities Information Processor that compiles market data much
more slowly.
Conflicts of Interest, Investor Loss of Confidence, and High Speed Trading in U.S. Stock
Markets: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland
Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. 5 (2014) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of
Sen. John McCain, Member, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg89752/pdf/CHRG-113shrg89752.pdf [http://
perma.cc/VV6D-QZKW].
6. The Securities and Exchange Commission has noted that “[u]nlike years ago,
trades today are transacted in milliseconds or faster and dispersed among many trading
centers. These changes have allowed large market participants to employ sophisticated
trading methods to trade electronically on multiple venues in huge volumes at very fast
speeds.” Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Large Trader Reporting
Regime, No. 2011-154 (July 26, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-154.htm
[http://perma.cc/Y2N6-DPEY]. Microwave transmissions were becoming increasingly
popular in 2014 for HFTs. Jesse Westbrook et al., High-Frequency Traders Find Microwaves
Suit Their Need for Speed, BLOOMBERG BUS. (July 24, 2014), http://www.businessweek.
com/articles/2014-07-24/high-frequency-traders-find-microwaves-suit-their-need-for-speed
[http://perma.cc/LS4K-SZ4X].
7. Bob Pisani, Plundered by Harpies: An Early History of High-Speed Trading,
FIN. HIST., Fall 2014, at 21.
8. Id. at 21–23.
9. Scott Patterson, SEC Chairman Targets Dark Pools, High-Speed Trading,
WALL ST. J. (June 6, 2014) http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-chairman-unveils-sweeping
proposals-to-improve-markets-1401986097 [http://perma.cc/R944-9QWM]; see also
PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 309 (“[R]egulators were concerned. The Securities and
Exchange Commission was worried about a rising trend of high-frequency trading firms
that were getting so-called naked access to exchanges from brokerages that lent out their
computer identification codes.”).
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the coin that those critics largely ignored. The introduction of ever-faster
communication methods transformed stock and commodity markets from
local exchanges with little liquidity into international markets that
dominated international finance.10
Twentieth century markets thus benefitted from ever-higher speed
trading advances, but were still hampered by the slow paced “open
outcry” auction markets that emerged from the nineteenth century.11 The
computer was only solely integrated into those markets and did not fully
arrive until this century.12 The modern HFT is the by-product of a muchneeded shift from the inefficient and sometimes abusive open outcry
trading floors of exchanges to the modern electronic trading platform.13
Before the advent of electronic trading platforms, traders on the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) would typically formulate orders in their heads
based on some market signal they viewed to be favorable.14 The trader
would phone the order into a broker’s trading desk, usually located on or
near a market center.15 The broker would transmit the order to a floor
broker on the trading floor by messenger, hand signals or pneumatic tubes.16
The floor broker would then take the order to the NYSE specialist’s post

10. Stijn Claessens et al., Explaining the Migration of Stocks from Exchanges in
Emerging Economies to International Centres 2, (Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research,
Discussion Paper No. 3301, 2002), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
311119 [http://perma.cc/45B7-CTBJ].
11. PAOLO PEZZUTTI, TRADING THE US MARKETS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO US
MARKETS FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADERS AND INVESTORS 5, 21–22, 63 (2008).
12. See Craig Pirrong, Upstairs, Downstairs: Electronic vs. Open Outcry Exchanges
3 (Feb. 19, 2003) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of Houston Bauer
College of Business), http://www.bauer.uh.edu/spirrong/upstairs1.pdf [http://perma.cc/
S5PX-Y2BT]; Pisani, supra note 7, at 23.
13. See Tom Polansek, Insight: Chicago Pits Going Quiet, 165 Years After Shouting
Began, REUTERS (Aug. 5, 2013, 10:47 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/05/
us-cme-grain-pits-insight-idUSBRE9740EC20130805 [http://perma.cc/R4AP-7PK7].
14. See SCOTT PATTERSON, DARK POOLS 273 (2012); CFA Level 1: Derivatives—
The Futures Trade Process, INVESTOPEDIA, http://investopedia.com/exam-guide/cfa-level-1/
derivatives/futures-trade-process.asp [http://perma.cc/M57C-RBGG] (last visited Sept. 12,
2015) [hereinafter CFA Level 1: Derivatives].
15. Asani Sarkar & Michelle Tozzi, Electronic Trading on Futures Exchanges,
CURRENT ISSUES ECON. & FIN., Jan. 1998, at 1, 1–2.
16. See Pisani, supra note 7, at 23; CFA Level 1: Derivatives, supra note 14
(discussing hand signals).
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where a listed stock was traded for execution.17 The process would be
reversed to report the execution of the order.18
This process was slow, cumbersome, and costly because commissions
had to be paid to brokers.19 The specialist was also paid a costly fee in the
form of the spread he quoted between his bid and ask quotes.20 The order
execution process was similarly cumbersome in the over-the-counter
(OTC) market where competing market makers had to be consulted in
order to assure the best execution price for orders.21 There too
commissionsȄor markups or markdowns—and spreads had to be paid to
brokers and market makers.22
The slowness of this process raised further costs concerns from
“latency” and “slippage.” Latency is the period of delay that occurs
between the time an order is formulated and the time that it is executed.23
The slower the execution process, the greater is the latency associated
with the order.24 Slippage is a reference to the potential change in the
price of an investment between the time a trade is contemplated or entered
and its execution.25 Delays in the order entry process, namely latency,
exposes a trader to greater risks of slippage and lost trading opportunities.26

17. George Sofianos & Ingrid M. Werner, The Trades of NYSE Floor Brokers, 3 J.
FIN. MARKETS 139, 140 (2000).
18. See Understanding Order Execution, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.
com/articles/01/022801.asp [http://perma.cc/25HF-3KU4] (last visited Sept. 12, 2015).
19. See Open Outcry, INVESTOPEDIA.http://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/open
outcry.asp [http://perma.cc/PYK8-NPTM] (last visited Sept. 12, 2015); Jason Van Bergen,
Paying Your Investment Advisor—Fees or Commissions?, http://www.investopedia.com/
articles/basics/04/022704.asp [http://perma.cc/L5QU-3N4E] (last visited Sept. 12, 2015).
20. Kenneth D. Garbade & William L. Silber, Price Dispersion in the Government
Securities Market, 84 J. POL. ECON. 721, 736 (1976).
21. See BD. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, REGULATORY ISSUES RAISED BY
CHANGES IN MARKET STRUCTURE 16–17 (2013), http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/
affairs/AffairsIOSCO/201402/P020140213531132659111.pdf [http://perma.cc/WG2W
P2QR]; Understanding Order Execution, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/
articles/01/022801.asp [http://perma.cc/AZT9-X9EF] (last visited Sept. 12, 2015).
22. Sec. Inst. of Am., Inc., Series 55: Commissions and Trade Complaints - Broker
vs. Dealer, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/study-guide/series-55/commissions
and-trade-complaints/broker-vs-dealer/ [http://perma.cc/UTM8-S6YC] (last visited Sept.
12, 2015).
23. Bhupathi, supra note 2, at 386 n.52.
24. Michael J. McGowan, Comment, The Rise of Computerized High Frequency
Trading: Use and Controversy, DUKE L. & TECH. REV., no. 016, 2010, at ¶ 16.
25. IRENE A LDRIDGE , H IGH -F REQUENCY T RADING : A P RACTICAL G UIDE TO
ALGORITHMIC STRATEGIES AND TRADING SYSTEMS 43–44 (2d ed. 2013).
26. See Goldstein v. Mortenson, 113 S.W.3d 769, 773 (Tex. App. 2003) (“The time
expended in placing phone calls allowed market positions . . . to change, often resulting in
serious losses . . . . The negative effect resulting from such a delay is known in the
industry as ‘slippage.’”).
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HFTs seek to minimize latency and slippage through the formulation
and transmission of their orders by computer algorithms and high-speed
data transmission devices.27 One HFT group spent $300 million to build
a high-speed data line between New Jersey and Chicago in order to reduce
order latency by three milliseconds.28 Another fiber optic project sought
to cut five milliseconds off order entry between London and New York at
a cost of a projected $500 million.29 Microwave transmissions are even
faster.30 The most recent development in the effort to reduce latency is
the use of laser communications.31
The efficiencies achieved by the high-speed transmission and execution
of their orders made HFTs successful.32 The specialists on the NYSE and

27. See ALDRIDGE, supra note 25, at 17, 23–24; Bhupathi, supra note 2, at 386-87.
28. PATTERSON, supra note 14, at 287.
29. Id. at 288.
30. MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS 267 (2014).
31. See Scott Patterson, Traders with Need for Speed Turn to Laser Beams, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 12, 2014, at A1.
32. The prospectus of a HFT firm, which was proposing to go public before HFT
trading activities were engulfed in controversy, advertised that it was:
[A] leading technology-enabled market maker and liquidity provider to the
global financial markets. We stand ready, at any time, to buy or sell a broad
range of securities, and we generate revenue by buying and selling large volumes
of securities and other financial instruments and earning small amounts of
money based on the difference between what buyers are willing to pay and what
sellers are willing to accept, which we refer to as “bid/ask spreads.” We make
markets by providing quotations to buyers and sellers in more than 10,000
securities and other financial instruments on more than 210 unique exchanges,
markets and liquidity pools in 30 countries around the world. We believe that
our broad diversification, in combination with our proprietary technology
platform and low-cost structure, enables us to facilitate risk transfer between
global capital markets participants by supplying liquidity and competitive
pricing while at the same time earning attractive margins and returns.
We believe that market makers like us serve an important role in maintaining
and improving the overall health and efficiency of the global capital markets by
continuously posting bids and offers for securities and other financial
instruments and thereby providing to market participants an efficient means to
transfer risk. All market participants benefit from the increased liquidity, lower
overall trading costs and enhanced execution certainty that we provide. While
in most cases we do not have customers in a traditional sense, we make markets
for global banks, brokers and other intermediaries, in addition to retail and
institutional investors, including corporations, individuals, hedge funds, mutual
funds, pension funds and other investors, all of whom desire to transfer risk in
multiple securities and asset classes for their own accounts and/or on behalf of
their customers.
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market makers on Nasdaq, who traditionally filled liquidity gaps in that
market, are now pretty much outdated.33 Instead, HFTs are dominating
markets and driving trading volumes on both the stock and commodity
markets. 34 By 2009, some two-thirds of stock-market volume was
attributable to “high-frequency traders, who can buy or sell in less than
400 microseconds, or nearly a thousand times faster than you can blink
your eye.”35 HFTs’ trading volume appears to have dropped in more
recent years, but were still estimated to be accounting for more than half
of all stock market trading volume in June 2014.36 Trading volumes in the
futures markets are also dominated by HFTs.37 However, critics of HFTs
claim that their high-speed trading is, at least in some instances, abusive
and disruptive of orderly markets.38 Those critics seek regulation of HFTs
in order to handicap their trading advantages.39 Countering those claims

Virtu Fin., Inc., Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933 (Form S-1) (Mar.
10, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1592386/000104746914002070/a22
18589zs-1.htm#dm16701_business [https://perma.cc/7FKX-Q2BB].
33. LEWIS, supra note 30, at 3.
34. Dennis K. Berman, The Game: Saving the Stock Market Only To Destroy It,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 2010, at C1.
35. Jason Zweig, The Intelligent Investor: Staying Calm in a World of Dark Pools,
Dark Doings, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2009, at B1.
36. Scott Patterson, High-Speed Traders Face Tighter Reins, WALL ST. J., June 6,
2014, at C1.
37. GARY SHORTER & RENA S. MILLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43608 HIGH
FREQUENCY TRADING: BACKGROUND, CONCERNS, AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS 27–
28 (2014), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43608.pdf [http://perma.cc/6GRJ-BDQW]. The
Commodity Futures Trading Commission has noted that:
An established body of data indicates the importance of electronic and algorithmic
trading in U.S. futures markets. In 2012, approximately 91.50% of exchange
trading volume in U.S. futures markets was executed electronically. Estimates
indicate that algorithmic trading first accounted for at least 50% of orders in
2009, and accounted for over 40% of total trading volume in 2010 . . . .
Increased automation in both order generation and matching, combined with the
exponentially faster communication networks . . . has in many cases reduced the
trade lifecycle to as little as a few milliseconds. As a result, high-frequency trading
(“HFT”) strategies have also become an increasingly important component of
automated trading environments.
Risk Controls and System Safeguards, supra note 4, at 56,545.
38. See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 30.
39. Sam Mamudi & Nick Baker, Mary Jo White Gets High-Frequency Embrace
with SEC Plan, BLOOMBERG BUS. (June 5, 2014, 9:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2014-06-06/mary-jo-white-gets-high-frequency-embrace-with-sec-plan [http://perma.
cc/L59B-ZX63]. Hearings were held in Congress in 2014 that considered the need for
such regulation. See Hearing, supra note 5.
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are studies that show that HFTs provide liquidity and actually stabilize
markets.40
The related development of unregulated “dark pools,” that is, non
public markets where orders are executed without the public scrutiny
available for regulated exchange trading, has aroused further concerns.41
Dark pools are anonymous trading platforms for trading stock listed on
public markets.42 Orders placed through an exchange are visible to the
public and all other market participants, but an order or an indication of
interest entered on a dark pool is revealed only to other dark pool
participants.43 This gives dark pool participants access to information
unavailable to the public.44
A popular book has condemned HFTs and essentially charged those
traders with improperly front running orders of other traders through their
advanced trading techniques.45 Especially criticized were trading programs
that took advantage of SEC regulations that had tried to equalize trading
opportunities.46 HFTs were using the requirement that investors receive

40. See, e.g., HFT Stabilises Modern Markets—Academic Research, AUTOMATED
TRADER (Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.automatedtrader.net/news/at/152493/hft-stabilises
modern-markets—academic-research [http://perma.cc/YJ6T-YCAS].
41. See PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 311 (2010); Patterson, supra note 9. It was
estimated in June 2014 that forty percent of U.S. stock trades were occurring on dark pools.
Cameron Smith, Stock Investors Can Handle the Truth, WALL ST. J., June 3, 2014, at A11.
The SEC has noted that unreported trades are not unique only to dark pools:
In general, dark liquidity (that is, trading interest that is not included in the
consolidated quotation data) is not a new phenomenon. Market participants that
need to trade in large size, such as institutional investors, always have sought
ways to minimize their transaction costs by completing their trades without
prematurely revealing the full extent of their trading interest to the broader
market . . . . In addition, broker-dealers acting as over-the-counter (‘OTC’) market
makers and block positioners long have provided liquidity directly to their
customers that is not reflected in the consolidated quotation data.
Regulation of Non-Public Trading Interest, Exchange Act Release No. 34-60997, 74 Fed.
Reg. 61,208–09 (proposed Nov. 23, 2009).
42. Austin J. Sandler, The Invisible Power of Machines: Revisiting the Proposed
Flash Order Ban in the Wake of the Flash Crash, 2011 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 003, ¶ 7
n.18., http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1217&context=dltr [http://
perma.cc/J2SW-WZJC].
43. Id. ¶ 6, 7.
44. See id.
45. LEWIS, supra note 30.
46. SHORTER & MILLER, supra note 37, at 19.
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the best price available anywhere on public markets to anticipate trades
on multiple markets and profit from that opportunity.47
Exposure of this practice set off a public outcry in the press.48
Regulators and politicians saw an opportunity to grab headlines by targeting
those traders for prosecutions and new rules. The New York Attorney
General launched a broad scale investigation into the trading practices of
HFTs in April 2014.49 That probe was later expanded into the dark pools
operated by Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., and other large banks.50 The
New York Attorney General, shortly afterwards, charged Barclays PLC
for misrepresenting the access it provided to its dark pool by HFTs.51
The SEC responded with its own investigation of dark pools in order to
determine whether they were undermining the integrity of U.S. markets.52
The SEC also proposed rules that would attempt to move trading from
dark pools to the public exchanges and subject HFTs to regulation by
requiring them to register with the agency as broker-dealers.53 FINRA
began an investigation of customer order routing practices by brokerdealers to determine if orders were being sent to execution centers on the
basis of payments for that order flow rather than the best execution price.54
47. See Hearing supra note 6, at 5 (describing that concern).
48. See, e.g., Jacob Goldstein, Trading Places, N.Y. TIMES ABSTRACTS, Oct. 13,
2013, at 14 (“high-frequency traders often can foil long-term investors by trading ahead
of slower players”); Jacob Goldstein, Putting a Speed Limit on the Stock Market, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/13/magazine/high-frequency
traders.html [http://perma.cc/92VG-2VUD]; Eric Levenson & Dashiell Bennett, Is HighFrequency Trading as Bad as Michael Lewis Wants You to Think?, THE WIRE (Apr. 1,
2014, 6:28 PM), http://www.thewire.com/business/2014/04/is-high-frequency-trading-as
bad-as-michael-lewis-wants-you-to-think/359903/ [http://perma.cc/89WS-2B95]; Sam Mamudi,
Charlie Munger: HFT is Legalized Front-Running, BARRON’S (May 3, 2013, 1:25 PM),
http://blogs.barrons.com/stockstowatchtoday/2013/05/03/charlie-munger-hft-is-legalized
front-running/ [http://perma.cc/NGZ6-EUJ9].
49. Scott Patterson, Subpoenas Are Sent to Fast-Trading Firms, WALL ST. J., Apr.
17, 2014, at C2.
50. Justin Baer & Scott Patterson, Banks Draw Trading Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., May
10, 2014, at B2.
51. Scott Patterson & Andrew R. Johnson, Barclays Sued Over ‘Dark Pool,’ WALL
ST. J., June 26, 2014, at C1.
52. Scott Patterson, Jean Eaglesham & Bradley Hope, ‘Dark Pools’ Face New SEC
Probe, WALL ST. J., June 10, 2014, at C1.
53. Andrew Ackerman & Bradley Hope, SEC Set to Spur Exchange Trading, WALL
ST. J., May 27, 2014, at C1; Patterson, supra note 36; William Alden, S.E.C. Chief Offers
Rules to Govern Fast Trading, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2014, at B1. The SEC appeared to be
following Germany’s lead, which enacted legislation in 2013 that requires high-frequency
traders (HFTs) to register with the government and subjects those traders to special
organizational requirements. Tim Cave, German Firm Quits Over Tough High-Frequency
Trading Rules, WALL ST. J. (June 5, 2013, 12:30 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/
06/05/german-firm-quits-over-tough-high-frequency-trading-rules/.
54. Scott Patterson, FINRA Opens Broker-Routing Inquiry, WALL ST. J., July 9,
2014, at C3.
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The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) launched a separate
investigation of incentive arrangements that sought to attract HFTs to
particular trading platforms.55
Congress also could not resist the publicity over HFTs. The Senate
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations scheduled hearings in June
2014 on HFTs to determine whether their trading was injurious to the
markets and whether trading incentives used to attract orders to particular
trading platforms were appropriate.56 Those trading incentives involve
“payment for order flow” from market makers to brokers as an incentive
to route customer orders to the payer for execution.57 Another practice of
concern are “maker-taker” payments, in which an electronic trading platform
charges fees or pays incentives for order depending on whether the parties
to an executed order initiated the trade or whether they accepted the
initiating order.58
Regulators and industry participants have raised further concerns over
the fragmentation of trading among electronic trading platforms and
traditional trading venues. As 2014 began, there were thirteen public
exchanges and some fifty “Alternative Trading Systems,” namely, nonexchange electronic trading platforms, that were open to HFTs.59
Compounding that complex array of markets, SEC “Regulation NMS
(National Market System) requires brokers to route their customer orders
to the exchange displaying the best available public price at any given
time.”60 This requirement has been used by HFTs to anticipate orders

55. Scott Patterson & Jenny Strasburg, High-Speed Trading Firms Face New U.S.
Scrutiny, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 18, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001
424052702303287804579447610625554506 [http://perma.cc/DY3C-KXZU].
56. Sarah N. Lynch, Senate Panel to Probe High-Speed Trading, Broker Conflicts,
REUTERS (June 9, 2014, 5:46PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/09/us-senate
markets-idUSKBN0EK20K20140609 [http://perma.cc/3G2J-HHX4].
57. Robert Battalio, Andriya Shikilko & Robert Van Ness, To Pay or be Paid? The
Impact of Taker Fees and Order Flow Inducements on Trading Costs in U.S. Options
Markets, 1 (Nov. 3, 2011).
58. William Alden, Senate Hearing on Fairness of High-Speed Stock Trading
Could Get Heated, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2014, at B5; Scott Patterson, Senate Turns Gaze
to Superfast Trading, WALL ST. J., June 17, 2014, at C3. The Congressional Research
Service also did an extensive report on HFTs. SHORTER & MILLER, supra note 37, at 34–
36.
59. Gary Cohn, The Responsible Way to Rein in Super-Fast Trading, WALL ST. J.
(Mar. 20, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023035633045794476
92855042948 [http://perma.cc/U3HY-4EDJ].
60. Id.
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complying with that requirement and to trade in front of those orders.61
Another concern is that the high message traffic generated by HFTs is
overwhelming the ability of markets and traders to deal with that volume,
and a number of computer glitches on exchanges have resulted in trading
halts and alarming market crashes.62
61. LEWIS, supra note 30. As was noted in Senate hearings on this issue:
One of the most predatory high-frequency trading practices depends on the on
unintended consequences of the SEC’s Regulation National Market System, or
Reg NMS. That regulation essentially mandated that investment firms must buy
or sell stocks at the best price available. While that might sound like a reasonable
requirement, hi-frequency trading firms can take advantage of the rule by putting
out offers to buy or sell small amounts of stock at attractive prices. When a large
investor, seeking to make a big order, accepts the high-frequency trading firm’s
offer because it is the best price available, the high-frequency trader can predict
that the large investor will have to go to another exchange to purchase the rest
of his order. The high-frequency trader can then race ahead of that investor to
the other exchange, buy up all available shares, and sell them to the large investor at
a higher price.
Hearing, supra note 6.
62. Concept Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated
Trading Environments, 78 Fed. Reg. 56542, 56549, 56551 (Sept. 12, 2013) (footnotes
omitted); see LEWIS, supra note 31, at 200, 202; Andrew Smith, Fast Money: The Battle
Against the High Frequency Traders, THE GUARDIAN (June 7, 2014), http://www.the
guardian.com/business/2014/jun/07/inside-murky-world-high-frequency-trading [http://
perma.cc/42CM-N4C8]. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission has noted that
errors in order transmissions have sometimes disrupted markets:
Increased interconnectedness encourages price efficiencies when economically
identical or related contracts are traded on multiple exchanges. However, it also
increases the speed with which a disruption on one trading platform, or within
one ATS or algorithm, can impact related markets. For example, a trading
platform may experience changes in the prices, spreads or volatility of one or
more of its products due to errors in an ATS or algorithm active in its markets.
Even if this algorithm does not trade elsewhere, such changes are likely to
quickly impact the prices, spreads, and volatility of related products on other
platforms, as automated systems attempt to arbitrage price differences. The
potential result is a cascading series of market disruptions, brought about by the
malfunction of a single ATS or algorithm trading on a single platform.
Transmission effects such as this are illustrated by events like the May 6, 2010
“Flash Crash.” On that day, major equity indices in both the futures and
securities markets fell over 5% in minutes before recovering almost as quickly.
After investigation by both the Commission and the SEC, it was found that a
fundamental seller utilized an automated execution algorithm to sell 75,000 Emini contracts (valued at approximately $4.1 billion) over an abbreviated time
interval. The algorithm placed orders based on recent trading volume but was
not programmed to take price or time into account; because of this lapse, a feedback
loop triggered continued orders from the algorithm even as prices moved far
beyond traditional daily ranges. Like the hypothetical example provided above,
these declines in the derivatives market quickly filtered over to different, but
closely related, products on many other exchanges. Soon after the initial moves
in the E-mini contract, similar extreme volatility was experienced by the S&P
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Part III of this article will describe early high-speed trading techniques
and the concerns they raised. Part IV will describe twentieth century stock
and commodity markets and the inefficiencies they engendered from their
lack of automation. Part V will show how those markets were automated
and fostered HFTs. Part VI describes the concerns raised by HFTs and
current efforts to regulate their activities.
III. EARLY HIGH-SPEED TRADERS
A. From Telescopes to Carrier Pigeons
A Japanese document written in 1706 recounts the tale of a merchant
who obtained considerable market advantage by having messengers use
hand signals to forewarn him of rice price changes at the Osaka rice
market. The merchant was able to observe those signals from several
miles away in Koriyama through a telescope. This information gave the
merchant an advantage over other merchants, and he was able to profit
greatly from that information. That merchant’s scheme, however, received
a setback after a drunken messenger was late and became confused over

500 SPDR exchange traded fund and by many of the 500 underlying securities
which make up the index itself.
Risk Controls and System Safeguards, supra note 5, at 56547. Later, the CFTC and the
Department of Justice brought civil and criminal charges against a trader charging that an
algorithm he used had also contributed to the May 6, 2010 Flash Crash. See Peter J.
Henning, The Fine Line Between Smart and Illegal, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/28/business/dealbook/the-fine-line-between-smart-and
-illegal.html [http://perma.cc/7TTD-353J] (describing those charges). The Senior
Supervisors Group, an international body for coordinating international supervision of
financial markets) has recommended stronger internal supervision and risk controls for
HFTs. John McCrank, Global Bank Regulators Call for More Risk Controls Around Algo
Trading, REUTERS (Apr. 30, 2015, 3:42 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/
04/30/us-banks-regulator-algotrading-idUSKBN0NL2I320150430 [http://perma.cc/NWB4
JM72]. The SEC, by consent sanctioned Knight Capital for failing to maintain adequate
safeguards to prevent the entry of millions of erroneous orders that disrupted the stock
markets on August 1, 2012. Knight Capital Americas LLC, Exchange Act Release No.
70694, 2 (2013). The errors occurred as a result of a programming error in allowing
customer access to a NYSE Retail Liquidity Program. Knight Capital Americas LLC,
Exchange Act Release No. 70694, 5–6 (2013). This conduct was found to have violated
SEC Rule 15c3-5, [17 C.F.R. § 15c3-5], which requires broker-dealers to implement
controls to guard against risks posed by the direct market access of broker-dealers and their
customers. Knight Capital Americas LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 70694, 4 (2013). This
rule requires broker-dealers to prevent automated system errors, outages and other failures
and to mitigate the effects of such problems when they do occur. Id.
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the proper hand signals. The merchant suffered large losses when he acted
on an erroneous signal sent by the messenger.63
Rice futures trading in Japan during that era were also using other highspeed communications to foster trading and obtain market advantage. By
1716, rice traders were employing “elaborate communications systems
based on smoke signals, flag signals, and carrier pigeons” that enabled
traders and brokers to transmit information between Japanese cities at a
distance of 350 miles with “great speed.”64
Fast sailing ships were long used in Europe for obtaining information
that could be used to profit from price changes in securities65 In the
eighteenth century, Sir Henry Furnese, “throughout Holland, Flanders,
France and Germany, . . . maintained a complete and perfect train of
intelligence . . . the fall of Namur added to his profits, owing to his early
intelligence.”66
Traders were able to profit handsomely by short selling the stock of the
East India Company in 1773, after receiving advance knowledge of the
Boston Tea Party.67 The tea destroyed in that affair was shipped from the
East India Company on consignment to colonial merchants.68 The East
India Company was in financial trouble at the time and was being bailed
out by the British government.69 A part of that effort was legislation that
granted the company a monopoly on tea shipped to the American colonies.70
However, the Crown refused to remove a tax on that tea that was abhorrent
to many in the colonies.71 The Boston Tea Party was a protest against
such taxation without representation.72 The loss of the tea destroyed in
that raid caused a sharp drop in the price of the East India Company’s

63. David Moss & Eugene Kintgen, The Dojima Rice Market and the Origins of
Futures Trading, HARV. BUS. SCH., Case Study No. 9-709-044 (Nov. 10, 2010) (Appendix),
http://disciplinas.stoa.usp.br/pluginfile.php/69204/mod_resource/content/4/CHY%20GE
D_LS-%23795938-v1-Dojima_Rice_Market_Case.pdf [http://perma.cc/VY7U-F8NP].
64. Id. See also Mark D. West, Private Ordering at the World’s First Futures
Exchange, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2574, 2586–87 (2000) (noting the use of this communication
method to transmit messages on rice prices between Tokyo and Dojima).
65. See generally Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation? 300
Years of Evidence, 75 WASHINGTON UNIV. L.Q. 849, 850 (1997).
66. Emery, supra note 2, at 116 n.3 (citations omitted).
67. NICK BUNKER, EMPIRE ON EDGE 239 (2014).
68. Significance of the Tea Act, 1773, BOSTON TEA PARTY HISTORICAL SOCIETY,
http://www.boston-tea-party.org/tea-act.html [http://perma.cc/6HQD-EFLP] (last visited
Sept. 12, 2015).
69. The Tea Act: The Catalyst of the Boston Tea Party, BOSTON TEA PARTY,
http://www.bostonteapartyship.com/the-tea-act [http://perma.cc/57RZ-RJXR] (last visited
Sept. 12, 2015).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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stock.73 Traders receiving advance information of that destruction from
fast sailing ships anticipated that decline and were able to reap profits
from those less informed.74 This information disparity was due in part to
the fact that the British navy, which carried the Royal mails, used a slower
route to travel back from America than did commercial vessels.75
After the Revolution, fast coaches drawn by horses and sailing ships
were used to speed market information in the United States.76 Within a
year of the founding of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange in 1790, express
coaches were speeding to Philadelphia from New York.77 Those coaches
carried news from ships docking in New York that could affect security
prices on the Philadelphia exchange.78 “Philadelphia brokers learned to
dread the sudden appearance of a stagecoach full of Wall Streeters
because it meant that they were in exclusive possession of important news
from London that might make them a small fortune.”79
Express coaches played a similar role after the approval by Congress in
1790 of Alexander Hamilton’s plan to refund the Revolutionary War
debt.80 That debt was virtually worthless before that funding scheme was
approved, but became quite valuable when Congress agreed to refund it
at par.81 Those receiving advance news of that plan quickly hired express
coaches and fast sailing ships, directing them to various cities and locals
to purchase the old debt at steep discounts for redemption at par.82 There
was much criticism of members of Congress who participated in these
73. BUNKER, supra note 67, at 239.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 320.
76. Philadelphia Stock Exchange Papers, THE HIST. SOC. OF PENN., Collection
3070, 1, 1, http://hsp.org/sites/default/files/legacy_files/migrated/findingaid3070phlx.pdf
[http://perma.cc/K27S-BVWQ].
77. Id.
78. As the Philadelphia Stock Exchange later noted:
[t]he speeding coaches that clattered from New York to Philadelphia carried
speculators and stockjobbers, agents of foreign investors, and inside traders with
privileged information that could move the market, and make their fortune at the
expense of the Philadelphia merchants.
Philadelphia Stock Exchange, THE HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF PENNSYLVANIA 1 (2006).
79. JOHN STEELE GORDON, THE GREAT GAME: THE EMERGENCE OF WALL STREET
AS A WORLD OF POWER 1653-2000, at 78 (1999).
80. ROBERT IRVING WARSHOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 123 (1931). See also RON
CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 297–306 (2004) (describing the political fights over
this refunding measure).
81. WARSHOW, supra note 80, at 123.
82. Id. at 123–24.
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purchases or tipped others.83 Thomas Jefferson called that effort a “base
scramble.”84 However, it was not until some 220 years later that Congress
passed the STOCK Act of 2012, which now prohibits such insider trading
by members of Congress.85
Advance information, received from a British sailing ship, of the
signing of the Treaty of Ghent that ended the War of 1812 led to large
profits by a speculator in New Orleans that resulted in a famous Supreme
Court case.86 It appeared that, on the night of February 18, 1815, certain
merchants received word from the British fleet that the treaty of Ghent
had been signed by the American and British commissioners—an event
that had already been published in the British press.87 This news was
made public in New Orleans through a handbill distributed at 8:00 a.m.
on Sunday morning, February 19, 1815.88 A merchant in the house Peter
Laidlaw & Co., who had earlier received that information, arranged to
purchase 111 hogsheads of tobacco soon after sunrise on that same
Sunday morning from another merchant who was unaware of the treaty.89
The value of the tobacco sold in that transaction increased from thirty to
fifty percent once information about the treaty became widely known.90
That increase in value was due to the effect that the treaty would have on
the reopening European markets to American tobacco.91 The selling
merchant reclaimed the tobacco after learning of the treaty and the issue
made its way to the Supreme Court, where Justice John Marshall ruled
that the purchaser had no duty to disclose that information to the seller.92
83. See 1 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES:
FROM CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS TO THE ROBBER BARONS (1492-1900) 80 (2002) (describing
that scandal).
84. WARSHOW, supra note 80, at 123. Jefferson was appalled at this activity and
charged that:
[c]ouriers and relay-horses by land, and swift sailing boats by sea, were flying
in all directions. Active partners and agents were associated and employed in
every state, town and country neighborhood; and this paper was bought for five
shillings, and even as low as two shillings, in the pound, before the holder knew
that Congress had already provided for its redemption at par. Immense sums
were thus filched from the poor and ignorant, and fortunes accumulated by those
who had themselves been poor enough before.
Id. at 123–24.
85. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act of 2012, Pub. L. No.
112–105; 126 Stat. 292.
86. Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. 178 (1817).
87. Id. at 182–83.
88. Id. at 183.
89. Id. at 181, 183.
90. Id. at 183.
91. Nicola W. Palmieri, Good Faith Disclosures Required During Precontractual
Negotiations, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 70, 122 (1993) (citation omitted).
92. Laidlaw, 15 U.S. at 181.
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The House of Rothschild regularly employed human couriers to provide
advance news of market moving events in the nineteenth century.93
Nathan Rothschild famously acted on advance news of Wellington’s
victory at Waterloo in 1815 that was supplied by an agent who had sped
to England aboard a fast ship after the battle.94 Rothschild used that
information to purchase British government bonds that rose in value when
knowledge of the victory became generally known.95 “Unfortunately—as
with every innovation in communications—it was not long before the
Rothschilds’ rivals were sending just as many couriers of their own.”96
To regain advantage, Rothschild turned to carrier pigeons to send market
information from European cities to London. Using a crude code, messages
sent by this method would advise whether to buy or sell securities.97
An increase in cotton prices in Liverpool, England in 1824 provided a
profit opportunity for U.S. speculators.98 When that news arrived in New
York, special packets were sent south directing cotton purchases, and
other methods were used to obtain advantage through special expresses
that were much faster than those available through the U.S. mail system,
which was then the normal method for transmitting and making public
news reports of market moving events.99 As one author noted:
[S]peculators sent packets to Southern cotton markets. The messenger who
arrived first made substantial profits for his employer by purchasing cotton at
normal prices. This was hardly an isolated occurrence. Speculators in Eastern ports,
especially New York, sought advance information about fluctuations in distant

93. John Maxwell Hamilton & Eric Jenner, Essay, The New Foreign Correspondence,
FOR. AFF. 131, 133 (Sept.–Oct. 2003).
94. Joseph Mandel, The Richest Dynasty in History?, BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 1998),
http://www.businessweek.com/1998/49/b3607071.htm [http://perma.cc/2H6A-6UYR].
95. Nathan Mayer Rothschild and ‘Waterloo’ ROTHSCHILD ARCHIVE, https://www.
rothschildarchive.org/contact/faqs/nathan_mayer_rothschild_and_waterloo [https://perma.cc/
5LRA-9P6F] (last visited Sept. 12, 2015).
96. NIALL FERGUSON, THE HOUSE OF ROTHSCHILD: MONEY PROPHETS (1798-1848)
234 (1998).
97. Id. Ironically, notice of Nathan Rothschild’s death in Europe in 1836 was sent
to London by courier pigeon. “[A] sportsman, looking for birds in the neighborhood of
Brighton, on the English coast, shot a pigeon which, when picked up, proved to be one of
the well-known carrier-pigeons of the Rothschilds. Under its wings was a small piece of
paper, bearing the words: ‘Il est mort.’” A Tale of Great Fortunes, 5 THE ILLUSTRATED
AM. 421 (Jan. 21, 1891).
98. Richard B. Kielbowicz, Speeding the News: Postal Express, 1825-1861: The
Public Policy of Privileges for the Press, 22 SOC. SCI. J. 49, 50 (Jan. 1985) (citation
omitted).
99. Id. at 50–51 (citation omitted).
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markets. Ships from Europe would sometimes dawdle along the coast while a
courier carried market intelligence ashore. Messengers then hurried the information
south. It was even charged that public mail carriers were bribed or delayed while
private messengers dashed ahead to convert their exclusive market information
into profits.100

In response to concerns over cotton speculations, the Postmaster
General proposed an express service between Boston, Massachusetts and
Augusta, Georgia in 1825 that would travel at the rate of eleven miles per
hour.101 That service “would convey information about ‘any sudden and
important change in the price of the principal staples of our Country.’”102
It was believed, that this service would “put a stop to the system of
speculation which has lately been so extensively practised by individuals
of one commercial town on those of another who were not possessed of
the same means of information.”103 Needless to say, cotton speculations
continued through other means. The Post Master tried again to forestall
speculators between 1836 and1839 by creating a rapid horse express that
operated between New York and New Orleans.104 However, it too did not
stop traders seeking trading advantages.105
A signal system between the New York and Philadelphia stock
exchanges using telescopes, semaphore flags, mirrors during the day and
lanterns at night was created in the 1830s.106 The operator of that then
high-speed communications system, William C. Briggs, a Philadelphia
stock broker, could flash information between those two exchanges within
minutes, allowing him to arbitrage stocks that were traded in both
Philadelphia and New York.107 D.H. Craig was also using courier pigeons
to send information to Boston from Halifax, Nova Scotia where ships first
landed with news from Europe.108

100. Id. at 50 (citation omitted).
101. Id. at 50–51 (citation omitted).
102. Id. (footnote omitted).
103. Id. at 50–51 (footnote omitted).
104. Id.
105. Pisani, supra note 7, at 21.
106. As one financial historian has noted:
Timely information is so important to securities markets that, in the 1830s, a
semaphore line sprang up between Wall Street and Philadelphia. Men were
stationed on tall buildings and hills every six or eight miles, armed with flags
and telescopes. The man on the top of the Merchants’ Exchange on Wall Street,
where the Stock Exchange was then located, would signal opening prices to a
man in Jersey City across the Hudson, and the information could get to Philadelphia
in about thirty minutes.
GORDON, supra note 79, at 79.
107. DAVID HOCHFELDER, THE TELEGRAPH IN AMERICA, 1832-1920, at 101 (2012).
108. MARKHAM, supra note 83, at 163; JAMES D. REID, THE TELEGRAPH IN AMERICA:
ITS FOUNDERS, PROMOTERS, AND NOTED MEN 609 (1879).
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A way to speed orders on Wall Street was through the use of “pad
shovers,” who acted as messengers between brokers. They were “walking
tickers” that would shove their messages right under the broker’s noses to
make sure they were read immediately.109 “Rushing the Pad, they used to
call the process.”110 William Heath, the fleetest of these pad-shovers, was
so fast that he was called the “American Deer.”111 The pad-shovers were
eventually replaced by faster communication systems, but messenger boys
continued to be “an important link in Wall Street’s flow of information.”112
The introduction of the telegraph in 1844 changed the speed of
communications by magnitudes and soon led to its use by speculators.
“The telegraph would have a profound impact upon the financial services
business and helped put an entire generation of carrier pigeons out of
work.”113 In 1846, a telegraph line between Philadelphia and New York
also replaced Briggs’s once high-speed mirrors and flags.114 It was soon
reported that “certain parties in New York and Philadelphia were employing
the telegraph for speculating in stocks.”115
The telegraph was also used to trade on advance information about Civil
War battles, allowing speculators to profit in the gold markets in New
York that were sensitive to such news.116 “Anson Stager, serving as both
U.S. Military Telegraph Corps (USMT) superintendent and Western
Union superintendent, and George Ladd, Western Union’s California
superintendent, both made fortunes leveraging their advance knowledge
of war news to speculate in gold.”117
This high-speed information advantage also induced “some crafty
manipulators” to profit from such information in advance of other traders.118
“A favorite ploy was to bribe a telegraph operator or war office clerk” in
109. EDWIN LEFEVVRE, THE MAKING OF A STOCKBROKER 160 (1924).
110. Id.
111. MARKHAM, supra note 83, at 245; A Shock to Wall-Street: Henry N. Smith and
William Heath & Co. Fail. The Culmination of Dealings That Began Before Black
Friday—A Blow From Vanderbilt’s Axe, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1885, at 1.
112. THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 82 (James E. Buck ed., 1999).
113. CHARLES R. GEISST, WALL STREET: A HISTORY 46 (2004).
114. HOCHFELDER, supra note 107, at 101.
115. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-CIT-469, ELECTRONIC BULLS AND BEARS:
U.S. SECURITIES MARKETS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 129 (1990).
116. “Gold prices would ‘gyrate with each new victory or defeat for the Union
army.’” RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN: AN AMERICAN BANKING DYNASTY AND
THE RISE OF MODERN FINANCE 22 (1990).
117. HOCHFELDER, supra note 107, at 104.
118. MAURY KLEIN, THE LIFE AND LEGEND OF JAY GOULD 69 (1986).
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order to obtain advance knowledge of military developments.119 “The
Lees, Grants, and Shermans had their counterparts in the great stock
operators who bribed soldiers, sutlers, politicians, and telegraph operators
in order to get the latest information from the front.”120
“The so-called Bogus Proclamation incident in May 1864 demonstrated
the power of telegraphic information (even false information) to influence
the gold market.”121 That incident involved the planting of a false claim
supposedly issued in Washington by President Lincoln and telegraphed
late at night by the Associated Press to newspaper editors in New York.
This bogus message stated that, because of war reverses, the President was
announcing the draft of 400,000 additional men into the Union army. This
caused stock prices to plunge on Wall Street and gold prices to soar.
Joseph Howard, city editor of the Brooklyn Eagle, carried out this scheme
and made a large profit from the hoax. Howard was sent to jail for this
fraud, but served less than three months. President Lincoln granted that
early release after announcing, only a few months after the hoax, that the
government would actually be drafting 500,000 additional men.122
In another trading coup, Robber Baron Jay Gould used fast ships to
trade in London on advance news that the Confederacy had capitulated.
Gould sold confederate bonds short in the London market, and those bonds
became worthless once news of the Union victory reached England.123
“The new technology of the post-Civil War years, the perfection of the
telegraph, telephone and ticker systems, drastically affected managing the
‘business’ of the [Chicago] board of trade” and the stock exchanges.124
The Atlantic cable was used to send quotes after it became fully
operational in 1866. “From the stock broker’s standpoint its prime value
was in transmitting instantaneous quotations, and orders to buy and sell
securities, between the continents.”125 As a result of that new high-speed
communication device, “financiers such as Peabody and Morgan could

119.
120.

Id.
EDWARD CHANCELLOR, DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL
SPECULATION 160 (1999).
121. HOCHFELDER, supra note 107, at 104.
122. The Civil War Gold Hoax, MUSEUM HOAXES, http://www.museumofhoaxes.com/
hoax/archive/permalink/the_civil_war_gold_hoax [http://perma.cc/FP74-LYTJ] (last visited
July 28, 2015).
123. Pisani, supra note 8, at 23.
124. JONATHAN LURIE, THE CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE, 1874-1905: THE DYNAMICS
OF SELF-REGULATION 8 (1979).
125. EDMUND C. STEDMAN, THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 195 (1905). The
Atlantic cable created an “arbitrage business, in which stock houses with foreign connections
learned to profit by the price differences between the New York and London markets for
American shares.” Id.
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move quickly in and out of markets, easily trade in foreign currencies, and
anticipate the effects of international news.”126
The stock ticker, which was invented in 1867, was an advance in highspeed trading technology, which “broadcast real-time financial information
from exchange floors to anyone subscribing to the service.”127 “Taking
the information supplied by the trading-floor reporters, telegraph operators
entered transaction data onto a circular push-button keyboard, activating
the print wheels of tickers in subscriber’s offices.”128
The telegraph remained the key to high-speed trading on Wall Street.
“Then, as now, traders believed they could make money if they knew
about trades before their competitors did.”129 A Harpers Weekly illustration
from 1873 shows a maze of wires “running from buildings around the
stock exchange, with Western Union promoting ‘direct wires.’”130 One
broker described the layers of telegraph wires used by brokers on Wall
Street and its environs as being so dense that, “[n]o bird could fly through
their network, a man could almost walk upon them; in fact, they darkened
the street and the windows below their level.”131 This network of wires
became such a nuisance that the City of New York required them to be
buried beneath the streets.132
“Thomas Edison’s quadruplex, a device that allowed four messages to
be sent simultaneously over one telegraph wire” was invented in 1874 and
further speeded Wall Street communications.133 The invention of the
telephone was another communications advance. In 1878, two years after

126. JEAN STROUSE, MORGAN, AMERICAN FINANCIER 65 (1999).
127. HOCHFELDER, supra note 107, at 102.
128. THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, supra note 112, at 116.
129. Floyd Norris, Sacrificing Sense for Speed in Markets, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/11/business/sacrificing-sense-for-speed-in-markets.
html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/556S-S29M].
130. Id. The first edition of the Wall Street Journal that was printed on July 8, 1896
contained front-page advertisements from brokers and bankers promoting their “Direct
Wire” connections. The Wall Street Journal’s First Edition, WSJ 125, http://wsj.com/
125/wsj-first-edition/#/#8 [http://perma.cc/58GS-HUTZ] (last visited Aug. 3, 2015). For
example, Spencer Trask & Co., advertised its direct wire connections among its offices in
New York, Albany and Providence R.I. and to markets in Philadelphia, Boston, and
Chicago. Id.
131. HOCHFELDER, supra note 107, at 101.
132. RUSSELL O. WRIGHT, CHRONOLOGY OF THE STOCK MARKET 19 (2002).
133. HOCHFELDER, supra note 107, at 23; Quadruplex Telegraph, ENGINEERING &
TECH. HIST. WIKI, http://ethw.org/Quadruplex_Telegraph [http://perma.cc/KT5V-XPNY]
(last modified Feb. 13, 2012).
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its invention, the NYSE installed the first telephones on its floor.134 By
1880, most brokers had telephone lines connected directly to the exchanges.135
It was thought by some that the telegraph and telephone limited speculation
by making important market moving information generally available. In
1890, however, the president of Western Union testified before Congress
that forty six percent of that company’s “message traffic was ‘purely
speculative,’ including ‘stock-jobbing, wheat deals in futures, cotton deals
in futures’ and horse racing odds, while only thirty four percent pertained
to what he considered ‘legitimate trade.’”136 The telegraph, in all events,
dramatically affected development of the markets. Some 250 exchanges
had operated at various periods during the nineteenth century, but many
of them were put out of business as a result of the telegraph.137
Large brokerage firms earned the sobriquet of “wire houses” by reason
of their high-speed telegraph and telephone connections with branch
offices and the exchanges.138 By 1905, a San Francisco broker was executing
orders within five minutes of their receipt on stock and commodity
exchanges in New York and Chicago. Another San Francisco broker had
a private wire to the Boston Copper Market.139 Jones & Baker was the
country’s largest stockbroker in 1917 and ran private wires to the homes
of favored clients.140 As trading surged in the markets during the 1920s,
commission brokers had in place some 500,000 miles of private wires to
transmit customer orders and information, including over 100 private
wires stretched between New York and Chicago.141
In 1924, the NYSE added ticker tape enlarging machines that allowed
the display of ticker tape information on large overhead screens on the
floor.142 By 1925, the NYSE also installed some thirty miles of copper
pneumatic tubes to connect its specialists’ trading booths with broker
telephone booths on the NYSE floor. Order execution instructions from
broker desks on the NYSE floor were placed in those pneumatic tubes by
“tube men.” In an effort that would presage efforts to slow HFT’s, “[t]he
pneumatic tube system was constructed so that a message traveling a long

134. WRIGHT, supra note 133, at 18.
135. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 115, at 129.
136. HOCHFELDER, supra note 107, at 103.
137. MARKHAM, supra note 83, at 334.
138. 2 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM
J.P. MORGAN TO THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (1900-1970) 8 (2002); J. Peter Ferderer,
Advances in Communication Technology and Growth of the American Over-the-Counter
Markets, 1876-1929, 68 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 13 (2008).
139. MARKHAM, supra note 138, at 9.
140. Id. at 86.
141. Id. at 129.
142. THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, supra note 112, at 143.
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distance would arrive at the same time as one sent by a shorter route, in
this way not giving anyone an unfair advantage.”143
In 1930, the NYSE introduced a new high-speed ticker that could report
trading activity at 500 characters per minute, nearly double the speed of
prior tickers.144 Stock market quotes were then sent from the exchanges
to a Western Union office in New York and punched onto a perforated
tape by clerks. “The tape was then fed through the telex machine, which
sent out electrical impulses that became the prices on the ticker seen in
brokerage offices around the country.”145
Many brokers had a “board room” for customers to observe a ticker tape
of trading activity on the NYSE.146 In the mid-1930s, there were over
9,000 tickers in the U. S. and Canada.147 Additional information shown
on the “board” might include current information on commodity prices,
foreign currencies, the number of shares sold each hour on the New York
Stock Exchange, and the Dow-Jones average might be posted periodically.148
In addition, earlier in the 1930s, the industry developed a mechanism for
projecting the ticker tape onto a screen by a trans-lux machine, which
made for easy viewing and was popular with customers.149
B. Early Co-location Issues
An issue of considerable concern with high-speed trading by HFTs has
been their efforts to locate, actually “co-locate,” their computer servers in
or near an exchange facility so that they can receive market data more
quickly and respond accordingly.150 Co-location, or other efforts to obtain
close proximity to an exchange, reduces latency.151 Co-location seeks the

143. Id. at 142.
144. MARKHAM, supra note 138, at 226; RICHARD J. TEWELES & EDWARD S. BRADLEY,
THE STOCK MARKET 149 (1998).
145. CHARLES R. GEISST, 100 YEARS OF WALL STREET 65 (2000).
146. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, INC., THE SECURITY MARKETS 230 (Alfred L.
Bernheim & Margaret Grant Schneider eds., 1935).
147. Id. at 252.
148. Id. at 230–31.
149. Id. at 230, 251–52.
150. Hearing, supra note 6.
151. As the CFTC has noted:
Two common methods for reducing latency are co-location and proximity
hosting, defined as the placement of a firm’s trading technology in close proximity
to the trading platform. They may be offered directly by an exchange or by a
third-party service provider. Co-location denotes those connectivity solutions
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same time and place advantage that exchange floor members have sought
and enjoyed over the centuries—a principal attraction for membership
zealously guarded then and now that usually comes with a steep price for
a seat on the exchange.
The informational advantages of a central exchange and co-location
have long been known. In Rome, over 1,600 years ago, one “way for
merchants to more efficiently spread information was to work physically
near each other. Knowing each other, seeing each other each day, and
gossiping together would undoubtedly increase the information flow
between the merchants.”152
The so-called Buttonwood Agreement, which laid the groundwork for
the NYSE in 1792, stated that the signers would sell “Public Stock” at a
fixed rate of commission and that members “will give preference to each
other in our Negotiations.”153 The Buttonwood Agreement effectively
limited membership of its members to the wealthier financiers in New
York, providing an exclusive society for stock trading at collusive rates
of commission. “Before long, the Buttonwood Agreement lapsed, but its
exclusionary principle served as the foundation of the New York Stock &
Exchange Board,” the predecessor to the NYSE.154 By 1819, the members
of that exchange reached a “mutual understanding ‘not to inform outsiders
of the bids, offers or transactions of any particular members.’”155 The
exchange floor then became a central source of valuable information on
the most current value of stocks traded through its facilities.
Traders on exchange floors could generate orders and respond to events
much faster than those removed from the floor.156 Even with the development
of the telegraph and telephone, floor traders retained a decided time and
place advantage over traders without such access. Exchange membership
“exclusivity allowed members to use the information obtained at the
Board for their own advantage in trades with nonmembers.”157 This
informational advantage did not pass unnoticed by politicians. The New
York Senate passed a bill in 1836 that would have prohibited the NYSE
from closing its trading sessions to non-member traders, but that bill was

hosted by the exchange itself, while proximity hosting indicates services offered
by third parties.
Risk Controls and System Safeguards, supra note 5, at 56,546.
152. David Kessler & Peter Temin, The Organization of the Grain Trade in the Early
Roman Empire, 60 ECON. HIST. REV., 313, 329 (2007).
153. STEDMAN, supra note 126, at 36.
154. STUART B RUCHEY , M ODERNIZATION OF THE A MERICAN S TOCK E XCHANGE
(1971-1989) 8 (1991).
155. STEDMAN, supra note 126, at 70.
156. WALTER WERNER & STEVEN SMITH, WALL STREET 29 (1991).
157. Id.
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defeated.158 Stymied speculators on the curb market drilled a hole through
a wall on the NYSE trading floor in 1837 in order to hear quotations.159
That practice was stopped, but during the Civil War, brokers paid $100 to
listen through a keyhole so that they could follow stock quotations on the
floor of the NYSE.160
The NYSE also sought to preserve its time and place location advantage
for floor members by restricting access to the floor by telephone and
telegraph devices. As Henry Emery noted in 1896, private wires between
Boston and New York were in popular use. “A change in price in either
place was known by the broker on the floor of the other within less than
thirty seconds. This was trade reduced to its finest point. It is not necessary
to point out how completely such dealings bring about a uniformity of
price.”161 In 1894, however, the NYSE required communications from
the floor to the telephone to be sent by a messenger. “This action was taken
solely for the practical purpose of bringing the business of other centres
to the New York market, and to more strictly maintain commission
rates.”162 This “was a backward step from the economic point of view, and,
on the practical side as well, the opinion is not uncommon that it diminished
rather than increased business.”163
Information from the trading floor proved its value in other ways. The
NYSE and the commodity exchanges sought to gain control over their
quotations by restricting and selling the right to receive that data through
telegraph lines.164 That information was deemed valuable and could be
sold to traders seeking high-speed access to exchange trading data.165 The
exchanges also recognized that they could shut down competitors by
denying access to their quotes.166 Some of those competitors were the
unsavory bucket shops that were essentially betting operations on grain
and stock prices:

158. MARKHAM, supra note 83, at 159.
159. Robert Steiner, The Big Board’s Bicentennial, 200 Years Later, Small Investors
Find Clout at America’s Premier Exchange, WALL ST. J., May 13, 1992, at C1.
160. STEDMAN, supra note 126, at 146; MARKHAM, supra note 83, at 242.
161. Emery, supra note 2, at 139.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. HOCHFELDER, supra note 107, at 101.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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As financial markets increasingly became markets in information, control of and
access to the flows of quotations became a major source of conflict between
exchanges, telegraph companies, brokers, and bucket shops. By broadcasting
quotations to a wider and wider audience, the ticker and telegraph network
enabled the dramatic growth in stock trading and ownership in the twentieth
century.167

The battle with the bucket shops over exchange quotations was all about
the trading advantages of such information. In 1905, the Supreme Court
strongly protected the exchanges’ power to sell and distribute that data
selectively in Board of Trade v. Christie.168 There, the Court recognized
the property right of an exchange in its trading data and the corresponding
right to control its use.169 The Court further rejected a claim that the
information should be made freely available because it was being used by
exchanges to encourage speculation.170
Exchanges have thus long employed the practice of selling market
information at the highest price the market will bear.171 The Supreme
Court did later place some limits under the antitrust laws on the
exchanges’ ability to use their market power to punish others by arbitrarily
denying access to their trading data. In Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,
the Supreme Court held that the NYSE could not order its members to
remove private direct telephone wire connections with a nonmember
without giving the nonmember due process in the form of notice of the

167. HOCHFELDER, supra note 107, at 102–03.
168. Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236 (1905).
169. Id. at 245, 253.
170. Id. Justice Holmes thus stated that the Chicago Board of Trade was:
[A] great market, where, through its eighteen hundred members, is transacted a
large part of the grain and provision business of the world. Of course, in a
modern market contracts are not confined to sales for immediate delivery.
People will endeavor to forecast the future and to make agreements according to
their prophecy. Speculation of this kind by competent men is the self-adjustment of
society to the probable. Its value is well known as a means of avoiding or
mitigating catastrophes, equalizing prices and providing for periods of want. It
is true that the success of the strong induces imitation by the weak, and that
incompetent persons bring themselves to ruin by undertaking to speculate in
their turn. But legislatures and courts generally have recognized that the natural
evolutions of a complex society are to be touched only with a very cautious hand,
and that such coarse attempts at a remedy for the waste incident to every social
function as a simple prohibition and laws to stop its being are harmful and vain.
Id. at 247–48.
171. After the author joined the CBOE as an executive in 1974, he was given the
unenviable task of informing the quote vendors that the exchange would no longer pay
them to publish the exchange’s price information. Instead, the vendors would have to pay
the exchange for that data. One vendor smashed his quote machine in front of me upon
being informed of this change, but the firm still paid.
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intention to sever those connections, a statement of the reasons for the
action, and an opportunity to be heard on the matter.172
In 1918, the NYSE prohibited specialists on its floor from disclosing
customer stop orders to others, namely, customer orders directing the
buying or selling of a stock when it reached a particular price. Traders
had been using that information to profit from those orders as market
prices changed.173 However, information in the specialists’ book of limit
and stop orders remained available to the specialists, providing them with
“special knowledge.”174 This allowed the specialists to have “a tremendous
advantage over the general public” when trading for the specialists’ own
account.175 The specialists claimed that this advantage was justified because
their trading provided stability and liquidity to the market and more
efficient pricing because they were making continuous two-sided markets
for customer orders. The floor traders on the NYSE could make no such
claims because their training was purely opportunistic. Those floor traders
did not make continuous markets and tended to accentuate price trends
and volatility.176
IV. TWENTIETH CENTURY EXCHANGES—THE PRE-COMPUTER ERA
A. The NYSE
The time and place advantage of floor traders on the NYSE over other
traders was well in place when the federal securities laws were enacted to
regulate their activities in the 1930s. As the SEC noted, during that
period, the exchanges operated as auction markets through a labyrinth of
brokers and specialists who provided liquidity for the stocks traded
through their facilities. The SEC has thus noted that:
[I]n the mid-1930s, the predominant markets for the trading of securities in the
United States were the organized stock exchanges. Predominant among these
were exchanges such as the NYSE and New York Curb Exchange (. . .[renamed]
the American Stock Exchange (‘Amex’), which operated as centralized, continuous
auction markets for the trading of listed securities. Those auction markets offered
liquidity, continuity, and depth to investors through the services of several categories
of member brokers and dealers: (1) commission brokers (who traded primarily
for the accounts of public customers); (2) floor brokers (who traded primarily for
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 365 (1963).
MARKHAM, supra note 138, at 86.
S. REP. NO. 1455 at 25 (2d Sess. 1934).
Id.
MARKHAM, supra note 138, at 125.
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the accounts of other exchange members); (3) floor traders (who traded primarily
for their own accounts); and, most importantly, (4) ‘specialists.’ Exchange specialists,
trading issues assigned to them at particular floor locations called ‘posts’,
performed the dual functions of effecting transactions in securities allocated to
them both for their own accounts (as dealers) and for the accounts of others (as
brokers). As dealers, the specialists assumed “affirmative” obligations to trade
for their own accounts in order to maintain market continuity and depth, and were
subject to statutorily imposed “negative” obligations to abstain from trading for
their own accounts unless such trading was necessary for the maintenance of a fair
and orderly market. As brokers, the specialists were required to execute not only
market orders (to buy or sell at the best current market price), but also limit orders
(orders to buy or sell at a specific price or better) and “stop” orders (orders
requiring the specialist to execute the order when a transaction in the security
occurs at or above the ‘stop’ price in the order).177

The process for executing a customer order was a laborious one that
involved transmitting the order by wire or telephone and then to a floor
broker for manual execution at a specialist’s post.178 Floor traders on these
exchanges still had a decided time and place advantage that gave them an
edge over “outside operators,” namely, traders entering orders from
outside the exchange, who also had to pay higher commission rates than
exchange members.179 Criticism of NYSE floor traders led that exchange
to prohibit them from trading for their own account unless their bid or
offer was at least one eighth of a dollar better than customer orders.180
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (34 Act) imposed statutory duties
of self-regulation on the exchanges. This required the exchanges to
enforce their rules against members through disciplinary actions.181 The
177. SEC, Self-Regulatory Organizations; Delta Government Options Corp.; Order
Granting Temporary Registration as a Clearing Agency, Exchange Act Release No. 34
27611, 55 Fed. Reg. 1890, 1895–96 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
178. The SEC observed that:
The exchanges of the 1930s were designed, through the interaction of specialists
and floor brokers, to accommodate trading by retail investors as well as
institutions. Typically, a customer’s market order, placed initially with a branch
office of a member firm, would be routed by telephone or wire to the trading
floor of the broker’s firm, usually in New York City; there, it would be taken by
a floor broker. The floor broker would then carry the order to the specialist’s
post, where the floor broker would either: (1) Match the order against a reciprocal
order represented in the crowd or left with the specialists, to be recorded in the
specialist’s “book.” When buy and sell orders could not matched, the specialists
would function as dealer, buying or selling a sufficient amount of stocks to
ensure a continuous, orderly market.
Id. at 1896.
179. MARKHAM, supra note 138, at 4.
180. Id. at 60.
181. As one court noted:
As national securities exchanges, the intervenors are self-regulatory organizations
(SROs).They therefore “have ‘a duty to promulgate and enforce rules governing
the conduct of [their] members,’ under the oversight of the SEC.” Exchanges
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34 Act directed the SEC to consider the complete separation of the roles
of “brokers” who execute orders for customers and “dealers” that trade
for their own account as principal with their customers.182
The SEC’s report on that issue focused on the roles of the specialists
and floor traders on the stock exchanges. The SEC noted the time and
place advantage of floor traders and specialists, which was especially
valuable when the NYSE ticker tape was running late because of heavy
trading in volatile markets.183 A late tape was not uncommon on heavy
trading volume days. The NYSE even had a “Ticker Tape Delay” indicator
that showed how long the tape was running behind the reporting of
trades.184

must file their rules with the SEC and ensure compliance therewith. Section 6 of
the Exchange Act requires that the rules of national securities exchanges, inter alia,
“provide for the equitable allocation of reasonable dues, fees, and other charges
among its members and issuers and other persons using its facilities”; “promote
just and equitable principles of trade”; and do not “permit unfair discrimination
between customers, issuers, brokers, or dealers” or “impose any burden on
competition that is not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes
of” the Exchange Act.
NetCoalition v. SEC, 715 F.3d 342, 344–45 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).
182. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE FEASIBILITY AND ADVISABILITY OF THE
COMPLETE SEGREGATION OF THE FUNCTIONS OF DEALER AND BROKER, at xiii (1936). The
SEC defined the role of a broker as someone who is acting as an agent of his customer in
the purchase or sale of
securities:
He does not undertake to sell to or buy from his customer but rather to negotiate
a contract of purchase or sale between the customer and a third party. The
transaction is solely for the account of the customer who becomes the owner of
securities purchased by the broker on his behalf, is entitled to the profits realized
and is liable for the losses incurred. The broker has no beneficial interest in the
transaction except the commission or other remuneration which he receives for
his services.
Id. at xiv. The SEC defined the role of a dealer as being:
[S]imilar to those of a dealer or jobber in merchandise. The dealer sells securities to
his customer which he has purchased or intends to purchase elsewhere or buys
securities from his customer with a view to disposing of them elsewhere. In any
such transaction he acts for his own account and not as agent for the customer.
He receives no brokerage commission but relies for his compensation upon a
favorable difference or spread between the price at which he buys and the
amount for which he sells. The risk of loss is entirely his own.
Id.
183. MARKHAM, supra note 138, at 209.
184. THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, supra note 112, at 161.
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The SEC’s report was critical of the role of floor traders because they
had no obligation to maintain a fair and orderly market.185 However, it
was not until the 1960s that the SEC effectively excluded such traders
from exchange floors.186 Even then, the specialists continued to enjoy
their time and place advantage. To be sure, that advantage was tempered
by a requirement that they maintain a continuous two-sided “fair and
orderly” market.187 This required specialists to quote a “spread” between
the price at which what it was willing to sell shares and the price at which
it stood ready to buy share.188 This was no penalty, however, because the
specialist captured the “spread” as a profit.189 All things being equal, the
specialist would profit on the difference in prices between his buy and sell
orders.190 This advantage of the specialist was thought justifiable because
the presence of the specialist gave assurance of liquidity for investors
seeking to buy and sell NYSE listed securities.191
NYSE rules continued to seek to protect the specialists’ monopoly over
NYSE listed stocks.192 Since 1863, the NYSE prohibited its members
from dealing in NYSE listed stocks outside the exchange’s floor.193 The
SEC, however, acted to stop the NYSE from enforcing that restriction
where its stocks traded on regional exchanges.194 In 1940, there were
seventeen such exchanges, but their volume was comparatively small, and
the NYSE’s restriction, found in NYSE Rule 390, on off-exchange trading
continued to apply to the larger OTC market.195

185. MARKHAM, supra note 138, at 209.
186. 17 C.F.R. § 240.11a-1 (2014).
187. Id.
188. Andy Kessler, High-Frequency Trading Needs One Quick Fix, WALL ST. J.,
June 16, 2004, at A15.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. That advantage was also subject to criticism. As one commentator has noted:
Being a New York Stock Exchange specialist—each stock had one—was a
lucrative business because there is information in every trade. Like Nasdaq
market makers, they didn’t charge commissions but instead would keep the
spread, or the difference between the bid and the ask price, measured in quarters
(25 cents) and eighths (12.5 cents). And specialists were notorious for front
running customers. Simply put, if they didn’t like the spread on a buy order,
they would buy shares themselves and then raise the price of the shares they had
to offer, knowing there was a buyer in the market. At a cocktail party many
years ago, I asked a specialist about this and he told me, ‘You big investment
banking guys shouldn’t worry about it, we need to get paid too.’
Id.
192. MARKHAM, supra note 138, at 244.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. MARKHAM, supra note 138, at 244.

584

MARKHAM2 - PRINT (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 52: 555, 2015]

10/29/2015 11:34 AM

High-Speed Trading
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Rule 390 posed a serious problem for the execution of large institutional
orders because the specialists did not have sufficient capital to execute
large block trades at a competitive price.196 This was important because
trading in the stock markets was being driven, beginning in the 1950s, by
institutional traders, rather than by retail traders who had historically
driven trading volumes.197
The growth of institutional size orders caused substantial conflict between
the exchanges and those institutions. The NYSE wanted to milk those
orders by requiring the institutions to pay the specialists’ spreads, and the
NYSE required those institutions to pay a large commission to the NYSE
member firm executing their trades. The institutions wanted neither to
pay the spread nor the commission. The institutions were particularly
galled that their large block trades, which required the same paperwork as
a small order, were forced to pay a commission magnitudes greater than
small trades.198
The lack of capital on the part of specialists to execute large block
orders led, in the 1950s, to block trading arrangements in which brokerdealers, like Goldman Sachs, assembled large institutional trades “upstairs”
and then reported them to the NYSE floor for execution.199 Brokerdealers arranged block trades upstairs by contacting known active and
196. See LISA ENDLICH, GOLDMAN SACHS: THE CULTURE OF SUCCESS 66 (1999)
(describing this inability).
197. As one source notes:
[I]n the 1950s, the stockbrokers’ world began to change. The profile of the “typical”
investor was changing, from the moderately affluent individual investor occasionally
buying or selling a few shares through his retail stockbroker to the continuously
active, professional institutional investor who was active in the market all the
time, buying and selling positions in dozens of different stocks everyday.
CHARLES D. ELLIS, THE PARTNERSHIP: THE MAKING OF GOLDMAN SACHS 135 (2008). This
growth of institutional trading led to an extensive five-volume study by the Commission
in 1973 on the identity of institutional traders and their role in the marketplace. 1–5
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
H.R. DOC. NO. 92-64, pt. 6 (1st Sess. 1971). The Institutional Investor Study was conducted
pursuant to a joint resolution of Congress, which directed the SEC to determine the effect
of institutional trading “upon . . . the maintenance of fair and orderly securities markets . . .
the stability of such markets . . . the interest of the issuers . . . and upon the interests of the
public . . . .” S. JOURNAL, 90th Cong., 82 Stat. 453 (1968).
198. This was an enormous expense for active institutional traders. For example, the
commission on a 100,000-share transaction was 1,000 times higher than the commission
on a 100-share transaction even though the costs of executing larger trades were not nearly
as disproportionate. Utilization of Membership on National Securities Exchanges for
Public Purposes, 38 Fed. Reg. 3902, 3915 (Feb. 8, 1973).
199. ELLIS, supra note 197, at 134–35.
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wealthy traders and institutional traders, such as pension funds, endowments
and other trusts, and insurance companies. The arranging broker-dealer
exposed the order in whole or in part to other institutional clients and
solicited those traders to take all or a portion of the block. Through this
process, the broker-dealer was able to obtain a better price on the block
than would be available if the block were simply dumped on the NYSE
floor.200 This provided some relief to those institutional traders, but they
were still suffering from the requirement that they pay retail commission
rates on their trades until the SEC began the process of eliminating that
restriction in the 1970s.
Before lifting that restriction, the SEC sought to block institutional
traders from becoming registered as broker-dealers. Before fixed commissions
were eliminated in the 1970s, many actively trading institutions had
sought to register with the SEC as broker-dealers in order to become
members of the stock exchanges. Such membership would have allowed
those institutions to avoid the exchanges’ fixed minimum commissions
that exchange members’ firms were required to charge to their non
member customers, no matter what the size of their trades.201 The NYSE
sought to block that effort,202 with the aid of the SEC, which was concerned
that large institutional traders might come to dominate the markets if they
were allowed to register as broker-dealers and become exchange members.203

200. ELLIS, supra note 197, at 135–37. By 1986, institutional block sales constituted
almost fifty percent of volume on the New York Stock Exchange, up from fifteen percent
in 1970. Report of the Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanisms II-16 (1988).
Although NYSE Rule 390 has since been repealed, block trading continues. In 2012,
monthly block trading volume on the NYSE was usually over $120 billion and was
exceeding $140 billion per month in 2013. See Factbook: NYSE Group Block Volume in
NYSE Listed, NYXDATA.COM, http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/asp/factbook/viewer_
edition.asp?mode=table&key=3140&category=3 [http://perma.cc/J4DG-E8JT] (last visited
Sept. 12, 2015).
201. The Commission banned exchange fixed commission schedules on May 1,
1975. See 3 MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE AGE OF
DERIVATIVES TO THE NEW MILLENNIUM (1970-2001) 29–30 (2002) (describing these
developments).
202. See S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 60–61 (1st Sess. 1975) (describing that resistance).
203. The SEC, therefore, allowed institutional traders to become broker-dealers only
if eighty percent of their trading was with the public, which effectively blocked most
institutional traders from becoming broker-dealer members. See Cliff Fridkis & Willam
J. Hunter, Securities and Exchange Commission: Coping With Institutional Membership
and Anticompetitive Practices, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 841, 858–59 (1973) (discussing
this controversy). Legislation enacted in 1975 also prohibited money managers from
creating affiliated broker-dealers in order to qualify as an exchange member unless they
did most of their business with the public. See MARKHAM, supra note 138, at 359
(describing that controversy). Congress was concerned with conflicts of interests between
institutions that combine the role of an unregistered customer and that of a broker. As
stated in a 1975 Senate report:
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In the meantime, NYSE Rule 390 gave rise to the so-called “third” and
“fourth” markets in NYSE listed stocks.204 The third market involved
transactions in NYSE stock executed for institutional customers by
broker-dealers that were not NYSE members and, therefore, not subject
to the requirements of Rule 390 or exchange minimum commissions.205
The fourth market involved transactions between two institutional
investors directly, without exchange or broker-dealer intermediation, and
it was these systems that led to the development of electronic communications
networks that match customer orders.206 In 1969, the Institutional
Network Corporation sought to develop an electronic network that would
allow institutions to trade large blocks of stock.207 This was significant
because the institutions were doing almost fifty percent of the stock

Until very recently . . . fixed commission rates have provided artificial
incentives for the combination of money management and brokerage. This
combination could distort the natural evolution of the markets. Where functions are
separated, institutions are customers for securities market services. As such, they
will seek the most efficient and flexible market relationships, and thus help to
sharpen price and service competition in the securities business. If the institutional
money managers are also the brokers, however, they will lose a good deal of
their incentive to bargain with the brokers on behalf of their beneficiaries, thus
sacrificing an important instrument of protection for the millions of Americans
whose securities investments are made through the medium of institutions.
S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 62–65. Institutions already holding regional exchange memberships
were allowed to keep them for a period of three years. “But it would be inappropriate and
inconsistent with the Congressional purposes, for an institution to acquire an exchange
membership during this period solely for the purpose of using that membership to effect
transactions for its own account.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-229, at 107 (1st Sess. 1975).
204. The first market is a reference to the distribution of shares to the public under
the Securities Act of 1933 and the second (secondary) market is the exchanges, NASDAQ,
and now other trading centers where already issued shares are traded.
205. As one standard text book has noted:
The third market is a market for large blocks of listed shares that operates
outside the confines of the organized exchanges. In the third market, blocks of
stock (units of 10,000 shares) are traded OTC. The participants in the third
market are large institutions (such as mutual funds, insurance companies, and
pension funds) that often need to trade large blocks of shares. Brokers assist the
institutions in the third market by bringing buyers and sellers together and, in
return, receive a fee.
RONALD W. MELICHER & EDGAR A. NORTON, INTRODUCTION TO FINANCE 298 (2011).
206. In the fourth market, “[c]ertain large institutional investors arrange purchases
and sales of securities among themselves without the benefit of a broker or dealer.” Id.
207. SID MITTRA, INSIDE WALL STREET 224 (1971).
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business at that time and were excluded from membership on the
NYSE.208
The NYSE and other stock exchanges otherwise traded pretty much in
the same manner as they did in the nineteenth century, but with some
marginal increases in communications technology. For example, the speed
of the ticker increased in the 1960s to 900 characters per minute.209 The
NYSE also experimented with “optical reader cards” that were filled out
by reporters at the trading posts on the floor that could be read by a
computer and transmitted over the ticker.210
By the 1960s, the NYSE Quotation Department also supplied quotes to
telephone callers by voice recordings. “Quote boys” phoned in the bid
and asked quotes for some 300 stocks. The voice recording was then played
back to subscribers to the service, which they could access by dialing a
three-digit code. At any one time, up to thirty-seven subscribers could
access the recorded quote for any one stock.211 By 1966, the American
Stock Exchange was using computers to input trading information from
the floor into its ticker system.212
Technology had not added much to order execution times on the
exchanges, and trading remained a cumbersome process in the 1960s.
Orders were phoned or sent by teletype to the floor operations of a brokerdealer, which sent them to a floor broker—by hand signal, pneumatic tube
or mechanical conveyor belt—who then conveyed the order to the specialist
for execution or placement in the specialist’s book of limit orders. The
process repeated to confirm the order on execution. As a SEC study of
the securities markets noted in 1963:
In spite of its importance, the floor of the NYSE has been untouched by most of
the technological developments of the 20th century. A critic of the NYSE’s
progress in technological innovation has said that the basic organization of the
Exchange’s floor has not changed since the ‘period in which the institution
solidified—slightly before the telephone.’ While the Special Study should not be
understood as espousing the proposals made by this commentator, there is
undoubtedly some merit in his analysis. Aside from recent developments in
methods of transmitting orders to the floor . . . and various innovations and proposed
innovations with respect to the reporting of transactions . . . there has been no
208. See id. It was noted in 1992 “[T]raders are shifting waves of business in NYSE
listed securities to the Fourth Market, in which large institutional investors trade directly
among themselves in informal groups, and to foreign exchanges, most of which are
completely automated.” Dale Arthur Oesterle et al., The New York Stock Exchange and
Its Out Moded Specialist System: Can the Exchange Innovate To Survive?, 17 J. CORP. L.
223, 227–28 (1992).
209. MITTRA, supra note 207, at 22; THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, supra note
112, at 192.
210. THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, supra note 112, at 192.
211. Id. at 185.
212. BRUCHEY, supra note 154, at 41.
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basic change in the methods of executing orders since the NYSE floor took its
present form. Except for firms utilizing teletype devices, orders reach the
Exchange by telephone and are written down on slips by clerks. From that point,
orders are transmitted manually by brokers, or through tubes, to-the trading post.
Orders given to specialists are again transcribed by hand onto the specialists’
books. At present there is no internal means of assuring that quotations
announced on the floor of the Exchange are the same as those disseminated to the
public. Even after the Exchange automates its off-floor quotation service such
assurance will not be provided.213

The NYSE faced a near total collapse at the end of the 1960s, when
increased trading volumes resulted in a “paperwork crisis.”214 NYSE
members were unable to deal with the avalanche of documents required
to document and clear this increased trading volume.215 Between 1968

213. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY OF UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES OF
BROKERS AND DEALERS, H.R. DOC. NO. 231, at 323 (2d Sess. 1971) (footnotes omitted).
The order execution process on the American Stock Exchange in the early 1960s was
described as follows:
The member firm’s booth clerk receives a sell order either from the firm’s order
room or branch office via telephone or teletype. The clerk relays the customer’s
limit order . . . from the booth to the floor broker. To do so he uses a hand signal
or writes the order . . . on an order slip and places it on a conveyor belt that
carries it to the edge of the trading floor. The floor broker acknowledges the
order and walks to the post where [the stock] is traded and hands it to the
specialist. The specialist stamps the order with date and time and files it in the
trading post rack until ready for execution. He executes the order when the
market price . . . [reaches the limit order price] and records the volume, price,
and clearing name . . . of the contra broker on the order slip. (If the specialist
executes the order for his own account he enters the sale and his trading book).
The specialist’s clerk then reports the execution of the order to the member firm
booth clerk via a pneumatic tube system. And in the meantime the data clerk at
the trading post has checked the accuracy of the stock symbol and sales price on
the sales slip. The sale is then entered into a key set, the data clerk verifies entry,
and the sale . . . appears on the ticker.
BRUCHEY, supra note 154, at 40.
214. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 213 (describing that crisis and its causes).
215. As the SEC later found:
The operations crisis in the securities industry first reached major dimensions in
August of 1967. Newspaper reports of that period recall the feverish efforts of
the Wall Street community to keep up with each day’s business: Stock
certificates and related documents were piled ‘halfway to the ceiling’ in some
offices; clerical personnel were working overtime, six and seven days a week,
with some firms using a second or even a third shift to process each day’s
transactions. Hours of trading on the exchanges and over the counter were
curtailed to give back offices additional time after the closing bell. Deliveries
to customers and similar activities dropped seriously behind, and the number of
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and 1970, over 100 NYSE firms failed, including several large ones, as a
result of their inability to document customer trades properly and in a
timely manner. This crisis resulted in an industry wide effort to computerize
and streamline clearing and settlement practices and paperwork. As a
result, by the turn of this century, the stock markets could execute and
clear trading volumes in the billions of shares, whereas before it had choked
on average trading volumes of 16 million shares per day.216
The floor trading operations of the exchanges were also subject to
abuse. Two specialists on the floor of the Amex were found to have been
engaged in the sale of unregistered securities and a massive stock price
manipulation scheme.217 A series of scandals erupted on the NYSE in this
century, as trading there was migrating to electronic trading platforms.
The Justice Department brought criminal charges against various specialists
for “interpositioning” their trades between customer orders. However,
those prosecutions failed. The SEC did obtain settlements from specialist
firms totaling some $240 million, over charges that those firms were
trading ahead of customer orders and for taking orders into their own accounts
that could have been matched against other customer orders. Another
SEC settlement involved fourteen specialists on other exchanges that were
alleged to trading ahead of customer orders.218
B. The OTC and Nasdaq Market
The over-the-counter (OTC) market traces its origins to the curb market
that began in the nineteenth century. In the OTC, or “curb” market as it
was initially called, trading took place in the streets of New York. Brokers
used messengers to send hand signals from their offices to the curb traders
in order to expedite orders. “Fingers were used to spell out the identity of
the security and the number of shares to be purchased or sold. To make it
easier for a clerk to pick out his broker in the milling crowd below each
broker wore some distinctive article of clothing—a colorful jacket or an
unusual hat.”219 However, the curb traders moved their operations indoors
errors in brokers’ records, as well as the time required to trace and correct these
errors, exacerbated the crisis.
Id.
216. See JERRY W. MARKHAM & THOMAS L. HAZEN, 23A BROKER-DEALER OPERATIONS
AND REGULATION UNDER SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES LAW, § 13:3 (2013) (describing
those improvements).
217. ROBERT SOBEL, AMEX: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE
(1921-1971) 260–66 (1972).
218. See JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM
ENRON-ERA SCANDALS TO THE SUBPRIME CRISIS (2004-2009) 143–44 (2011) (describing
those scandals).
219. BRUCHEY, supra note 154, at 17.
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in 1921 to the Curb Exchange that later became the American Stock
Exchange.220
Nevertheless, a network of brokers continued to operate an informal,
but significant, OTC market. This market became more formalized with
the founding of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., (now
FINRA), which became formally recognized as an industry selfregulatory body by the after passage of legislation in 1938 authorizing that
role under the federal securities laws.221
Rather than employing a specialist’s post on an exchange floor, OTC
trading was conducted by telephone and telegraph during much of the
twentieth century.222 By the 1930s, some OTC broker-dealers specialized
in particular OTC securities and, like a specialist, provided “broad and
continuous” markets in those securities.223 Quotations for OTC securities
were published in the “pink sheets” starting in 1911, so named because
the quotations were printed on pink paper.224 The quotes in the pink sheets
were not firm. They were merely a “guide” as to what the securities could
have been bought or sold for at the time the quotes were compiled.225 This
meant that a broker posting quotations in the pink sheets had to be
contacted by telephone. A firm order price could then be negotiated that
might vary from the quote in the pink sheets based on order size or
changes in market conditions.
In 1963, the SEC completed a massive study of the securities markets.226
Among other things, it found abuses by brokers using the pink sheets to
220.
221.
222.

See SOBEL, supra note 217, at 1–2, 21.
See MARK INGEBRETSEN, NASDAQ 41–43 (2002) (describing this history).
THE SECURITY MARKETS: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF A SPECIAL
STAFF OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND 265–66 (Alfred L. Bernheim & Margaret Grant
eds., 1935).
223. Id. at 265.
224. MARKHAM, supra note 138, at 60.
225. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95, at 635 (1st Sess.
1963).
226. The SEC Special Study described the OTC market as follows:
Transactions in securities outside the organized securities exchanges are
described as taking place in the over-the-counter market. The over-the-counter
market is actually a group of markets, in which broker-dealers transact business
with the public as principals or agents, dealing for the most part in securities not
listed on any exchanges. Some dealers may maintain inventories in one or more
over-the-counter securities and be willing to both buy and sell them to other
broker-dealers, in which case they are known as “market makers” in those securities.
Id. at 13.
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engage in manipulative activity. The SEC’s Special Study suggested
using computers to report broker-dealer OTC stock quotations.227 The
suggestion in the Special Study gave rise to the creation of the Nasdaq
market in 1968.228 That market allowed broker-dealer quotes to be posted
on a computer network that could be accessed by other broker-dealers,
and it allowed more rapid updating of quotes. Still, orders had to be
negotiated orally over the telephone.229
Unlike the specialists on the NYSE, Nasdaq market makers competed
with each other for stocks traded on Nasdaq.230 Multiple market makers
might compete with each other for a single Nasdaq stock.231 The Nasdaq
market makers, nevertheless, had market making obligations that required
them to quote a continuous two-sided market that was fair and orderly.232
This meant, however, that customers had to pay the spread between the
bid and ask prices of those market makers, plus a brokerage commission
or a mark up or mark down when the broker-dealer was selling for its own
account.233
C. The Futures Markets
The futures markets are regulated separately from the securities markets
and by an independent regulator, the Commodity Futures Trading

227. The Special Study stated that:
Apart from the possible utilization of a computer for the crossing of orders, the
information supplied by a computer system could be expected to confer important
benefits on broker-dealers and on the public. It would permit the immediate
identification of the highest bid and lowest offer, and thus facilitate the task of a
broker-dealer in obtaining the best market for his customer. Another advantage
would be the compilation of complete data relating to quotations and transactions, so
that actual price and volume data could be made public as in the case of listed
securities, thus improving the ability of investors, lending institutions, and other
interested persons to evaluate over-the-counter securities and markets. The data
could also be speedily and comprehensively retrieved for surveillance or study
purposes by the Commission and other regulatory bodies to which access would
be granted.
Id.
228. MARKHAM, supra note 138, at 347. Nasdaq is an acronym for National Association
of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation system. INGEBRETSEN, supra note 221, at 18.
229. MARKHAM, supra note 138, at 247. The pink sheets continued to publish quotes
for stocks not actively traded or quoted on Nasdaq. MARKHAM, supra note 201, at 18.
230. What’s the Difference Between a Nasdaq Market Maker and a NYSE Specialist?,
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/128.asp [http://perma.cc/2QPS
MMEG] (last visited Sept. 12, 2015).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. See Certain Market Making Activities on Nasdaq, Exchange Act Release No.
34-40900, 1998 WL 919673 (Jan. 11, 1999) (describing role of Nasdaq market makers).
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Commission (CFTC).234 The futures markets historically operated as a
public open outcry market carried out on commodity exchange floors.235
However, those floor operations varied materially from those on the
securities markets, and no OTC trading was allowed for futures.236
Starting in the nineteenth century and still in practice today for nonelectronic executions, orders to the floor of a commodity futures exchange
were transmitted to an order desk operated by a futures commission merchant
(FCM) on the floor.237 The order was then taken manually to the pit by a
runner, or the order might be flashed by the runner through hand signals
to a floor broker located in the trading pit.238 The floor broker would then
execute the order by public outcry in the pit against other customer orders
represented by floor brokers or with floor traders trading for their own
accounts.239 The floor traders had the time and place advantages of the
specialists on the stock exchanges but had no obligation to maintain fair
and orderly or continuous market.240
The execution of customer orders in commodity futures trading pits
were often chaotic in actively traded contracts during volatile markets.
“Trade throughs” of customer limit orders were common in “fast” markets
because floor brokers could not react in time to sharp market movements.
The popular movie Trading Places that was released in 1983 paints a
realistic picture of some of the more active pits.
The commodity futures exchanges were regulated by the Commodity
Exchange Act of 1936.241

234. That regulation is carried out under the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, 7
U.S.C. §§ 1–9097 (2012).
235. See JERRY W. MARKHAM, THE HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING AND
ITS REGULATION 40 (1986).
236. Open Outcry, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_outcry#cite_note
hand-signals-2 [https://perma.cc/V7Q7-3JEN] (last modified May 25, 2015).
237. Futures Commission Merchant (FCM), NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, https://www.
nfa.futures.org/nfa-registration/fcm/index.HTML [https://perma.cc/T64P-M9FU] (last visited
Sept. 12, 2015).
238. How Open Outcry Works in American Futures Trading, FOR DUMMIES, http://
www.dummies.com/how-to/content/how-open-outcry-works-in-american-futures-trading.
html [http://perma.cc/UFN6-WPZS] (last visited Sept. 12, 2015).
239. Id.
240. See MARKHAM, supra note 235, at 51 (describing the development and trading
on the futures exchanges).
241. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1–9097 (2012).

593

MARKHAM2 - PRINT (DO NOT DELETE)

10/29/2015 11:34 AM

D. The CBOE
Another model of the open outcry exchange was the Chicago Board
Options Exchange, Inc. (CBOE), which had elements of both a stock and
a commodity futures exchange. The CBOE, which was created in 1973,
used a futures style trading pit for trading in its standardized option
contracts. Floor brokers held and executed customer market orders, but
customer limit orders were held and executed through a separate book
managed by a “board broker.” The board broker was initially an exchange
member but later was replaced by exchange employees. The effect of this
arrangement was to separate the role of a specialist from the book of limit
orders.242
Market making functions on the CBOE were carried out by floor traders
trading for their own accounts.243 However, unlike the floor traders on
commodity futures exchanges, but like market makers and specialists in
the stock markets, CBOE floor traders had affirmative obligations to trade
for their own accounts in order to maintain a continuous and orderly twosided market.244 The stock exchanges attempted to compete with the
CBOE using those exchanges’ traditional specialists as market makers.245
However, the CBOE dominated options trading until the advent of electronic
trading.
V. AUTOMATION ARRIVES
A. Introduction
Automation began arriving on the stock exchanges in the 1970s in the
form of automated executions for small traders. The NYSE implemented
a Designated Order Turnaround (DOT) system in 1976—and in 1984, the
Super DOT system—that provided for the automated execution of small
customer orders, namely, orders of 2,000 shares or less, at the bid and ask
prices posted by the specialist.246 This advanced the speed execution of
those customer orders, but the specialist was still compensated by the
spread between those bid and ask prices.247

242. See Jerry W. Markham & David J. Gilberg, Stock and Commodity Options –
Two Regulatory Approaches and Their Conflicts, 47 ALB. L. REV. 741, 744–45 (1983)
(describing this process).
243. See id. at 745.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 746.
246. Jerry W. Markham & Daniel J. Harty, For Whom the Bell Tolls: The Demise of
Exchange Trading Floors and the Growth of ECNs, 33 IOWA J. CORP. L. 865, 897 (2008).
247. See MARKHAM, supra note 201, at 102–03.
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In 1978, the SEC authorized the Cincinnati Stock Exchange to operate
an electronic trading system in which agency and principal limit orders
would be matched by computer. However, it had a very low volume
exchange with only limited participation by a few large broker-dealers.248
However, other traders were discovering that the computer could be used
as a tool for trading. The advent of algorithmic trading brought numerous
active traders into the markets. For example, so-called “program trading”
appeared in the 1970s, which employed computer software programs to
generate automated orders through algorithms cued to react to market
events.249 “Index arbitrage” traders also appeared. These were traders
who tried to take advantage of small differences in the prices between a
basket of stocks traded on NYSE and a parallel commodity futures index
covering that basket.250
In response to program trading and arbitrage trading of index products,
NYSE specialists began to offer “baskets” of securities that allowed
institutional investors to trade all 500 stocks in the Standard & Poor’s
Index in a single trade of a minimum of $5 million. Customized baskets
of fewer stocks were also permitted.251 This allowed program traders and
Index arbitrage traders to hedge and trade positions in both the derivative
and equity markets.
Concern arose that these computer driven traders were adding volatility
to the market.252 Critics also warned that a “cascade” scenario could result
from algorithmic trades that would automatically generate sell orders in a
declining market and push prices lower, thereby generating more sell
orders and so on until the market crashed.253 Those concerns seemed to
have been justified by the Stock Market Crash of 1987, which witnessed
248. BRUCHEY, supra note 154, at 63. One of the leaders in that experiment was
Bernie Madoff, who later became the world’s largest crook through a massive Ponzi
scheme that was exposed in the market downturn during the Financial Crisis in 2008. See
DIANA B. HENRIQUES, THE WIZARD OF LIES: BERNIE MADOFF AND THE DEATH OF TRUST 68
(2011) (describing that involvement).
249. See Jerry W. Markham & Rita McCloy Stephanz, The Stock Market Crash of
1987––The United States Looks at New Recommendations, 76 GEO. L. J. 1993, 2000
(1988) (describing program trading).
250. Id. at 2001.
251. William Power, Big Board To Launch ‘Basket’ Trades Today, WALL ST. J., Oct.
26, 1989, at C1.
252. SENIOR SUPERVISORS GRP., ALGORITHMIC TRADING BRIEFING NOTE (2015),
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/banking/2015/SSG-algorithmic-trading
2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/367C-USG4].
253. See Markham & Stephanz, supra note 249, at 2001 (describing those studies).
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a stock market decline in excess of the crash in 1929. NYSE stocks lost
$1 trillion in value during the 1987 crash and the Dow Jones Industrial
Average dropped 508 points on a single day.254 Studies by the SEC, the
CFTC and others of the Stock Market Crash of 1987 concluded that
computerized trading had played a large role in adding volatility to the
market.255 A Presidential Commission also studied the trading of those
institutional traders and suggested reforms, hardly any of which were
implemented.256 Instead, the markets quickly recovered and computer
trading became an accepted part of trading in both the futures and stock
markets.
The causes of the Stock Market Crash of 1987 were much debated, but
the inability of the NYSE and Nasdaq markets to handle the execution of
large volumes of orders in a volatile market was disturbingly clear. A
report by the Government Accounting Office found that thousands of
customers had complained about the October crash and that most of those
complaints related to difficulties in trade executions. An investor hotline
received some 6,700 calls from investors who lost $450 million in the
market, an average of $172,000 per caller.257 It was also determined that
specialists on the NYSE had been unable to cope with the trading volumes
during the October 1987 crisis and that many Nasdaq market makers had
fled from the market, abandoning their market making obligations in the
process.258
Like the NYSE, Nasdaq developed an automated “Small Order Execution
System” (SOES) that executed smaller orders automatically at bid and ask
prices set by Nasdaq market makers.259 That SOES system became a
target of the so-called “SOES Bandits” who traded for their own account
and used computerized access to the SOES to take advantage of the failure
by Nasdaq market makers to keep their electronic quotes updated to reflect
current events.260 The SOES bandits traded often and broker-dealers gave
them office space as well as training programs on how to trade frequently
and at high speed.261 The NASDAQ market makers responded to those
attacks by widening their spreads and engaging in prohibited collusive

254. PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MKT. MECHANISMS, 88-32-P, REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS 1 (1988).
255. See Markham & Stephanz, supra note 249, at 1993–2043 (describing those
studies).
256. PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS, supra note 254, at 2.
257. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-88-38, FINANCIAL MARKETS:
PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON THE OCTOBER 1987 CRASH 50 (1987).
258. MARKHAM, supra note 201, at 219–20.
259. Id. at 219.
260. Id. at 219–20.
261. Id. (describing the trading of SOES Bandits).
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activities.262 After those practices were exposed, the SEC assessed NASD
with a large penalty for failing to supervise the market makers and the
Nasdaq market was required to reorganize its self-regulatory operations.263
B. The ECNS Arrive
Order matching services outside the confines of exchange floors were
appearing before the beginning of the twenty-first century.264 These
services were called “electronic communications networks” (ECNs) and
later “alternative trading systems” (ATS). In the beginning, the ECNs
were mostly order matching services that paired offsetting buy and sell
orders from different traders. Trading on those ECNs was, therefore, order
driven. There was initially no market maker or specialist that maintained a
continuous two-sided market on the newly arrived ECNs, which caused
liquidity concerns.265 This process also meant that the traders did not have
262. Report Pursuant to Section 21 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Regarding the NASD and the NASDAQ Market, Securities Exchange Act Release No.
37542 (Aug. 8, 1996). The SEC had approved a rule proposed by the National Association
of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) that had sought to exclude “professional traders” from
using SOES. That rule was remanded by the District Columbia Court of Appeals to the
SEC for further action because its definition of what is a professional trader was vague
and unjustified. Timpinaro v. SEC, 2 F.3d 453, 455, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The SOES
bandits and other day traders did raise concerns because they were not required to post
margin on their trades unless the position was carried overnight. See MARKHAM & HAZEN,
supra note 216, § 8:11 (describing this concern). FINRA required “pattern day traders” to
maintain minimum equity of $25,000 on any day that the customer day trades, and it
imposed other leverage restrictions, none of which involved registration as a broker-dealer.
See id. (describing these restrictions).
263.
See Certain Market Making Activities on Nasdaq, Exchange Act Release No.
34-40900, 1998 WL 919673 (Jan. 11, 1999) at 7–8 (describing the misconduct of Nasdaq
market makers and imposing sanctions on the NASD and Nasdaq).
264. Technology was also affecting the market in other ways. For example in 1981,
commodity market data vendors began to broadcast data through satellites. FM sideband
was another way to speed such data. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 115, at
219–20.
265. The critical role of exchanges has historically been to provide liquidity so that
owners of stock can sell or liquidate their ownership interest in exchange for cash. “A
market with liquidity is one in which the investor can really convert his securities into cash
at a price close to the last sale.” WILLIAM MCCHESNEY MARTIN, JR., THE SECURITIES
MARKETS: A REPORT, WITH RECOMMENDATIONS 10 (1971) (submitted to the Board of
Governors of the New York Stock Exchange). One measure of liquidity is how rapid a
stock can be bought or sold and another is the width of the spread between bids and offers
in the market. The debate over the “black box” exchange of fully automated trading by
the matching of orders to computers with met by the concern that order matching alone
would not make an effective market:
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to pay the specialist or market makers the spreads demanded where the
orders were executed on the NYSE or Nasdaq.266 Consequently, liquidity
on these ECNs depended on the presence of a buyer and seller entering
opposing matching orders or by acceptance of a quoted bid or offer posted
by another trader who might be quoting only one side of the market.267
Nevertheless, ECNs were soon changing the markets.268
By the end of the twentieth century, ECNs and other non-traditional
trading venues executed more than twenty percent of volume in Nasdaq
listed shares.269 However, only four percent of exchange listed shares
were traded on ECNs at that time because NYSE Rule 390 still applied to
most of the more actively traded shares listed on that exchange.270 The
growth of ECNs exploded as the twenty-first century began, aided by the
repeal of NYSE Rule 390 in 2000.271
In the overwhelming majority of stocks, public buying and selling is often
insufficient to ensure that the order of a willing buyer can always be matched
with that of a willing seller. For that reason, markets are created or their quality
is improved my professional traders (specialists or market makers) who put their
own capital at risk and thereby supply liquidity to the markets.
BRUCHEY, supra note 154, at 63 (quoting Norman Poser).
266. Cory Mitchell, ECN Credits: Let Your Broker Pay Your Trading Fees, INVESTOPEDIA
(Sept. 17, 2009), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/trading/09/ecn-credits.asp [http://
perma.cc/P5GH-B2EE ].
267. Id.
268. The SEC observed in 1991 that:
[I]n today’s securities market many small individual investors have relinquished
direct management of their investments to professional investment managers.
Accordingly, large institutional investors such as public and private pension or
retirement funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, foundations, hedge funds
and investment managers have grown extraordinarily in number and size, and
have become a predominant type of market participant. Investor demands for
returns greater than market averages have caused institutional investors and
investment managers to develop complex and innovative relationships, products, and
trading strategies. These new investment relationships, products and strategies
have led to increased specialization in investment management and linked capital
markets around the world. These developments enable institutional investors to
trade large amounts of securities and commodities with stunning swiftness to
minimize risk or to profit from small differences in valuation.
Large Trader Reporting System, Exchange Act Release No. 29593, 56 Fed. Reg. 42,550
(Aug. 22, 1991).
269. Thousands of traders were using electronic trading systems as the twentieth
century closed to engage in HFTs. One discount electronic trading firm discounted
commissions and its clientele trading some 95 million shares per day, which was then about
ten percent of Nasdaq trading volumes. MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 216, § 2:39.
270. MARKHAM, supra note 201, at 31; James McAndrews & Chris Stefanadis, The
Emergence of Electronic Communications Networks in the U.S. Equity Markets, CURRENT
ISSUES ECON. & FIN., Oct. 2000, at 4, http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues/
ci6-12.pdf [http://perma.cc/DE2Y-GKAL].
271. The growth of HFTs has been described by one author as flowing from the
development of ECNs regulated as ATS by the SEC:

598

MARKHAM2 - PRINT (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 52: 555, 2015]

10/29/2015 11:34 AM

High-Speed Trading
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Both Nasdaq and the NYSE gradually introduced electronic trading into
their operations until the old school NYSE specialists and Nasdaq market
makers were pretty much sidelined.272 Indeed, the NYSE specialists changed
their identity and began calling themselves “liquidity providers.”273 HFTs
are now dominating trading volumes and providing market liquidity as a
substitute for the traditional specialist and Nasdaq market maker.274
Today, floor trading operations are only a ghost of what had once been a
colorful spectacle often portrayed in news reports as the essence of the
stock and commodity exchanges.275
This shift did not escape the SEC’s notice. In 2010, the SEC noted that
HFTs and other proprietary trading firms “largely have replaced more
traditional types of liquidity providers in the equity markets.”276 As the
Individual investors subscribing to ECNs can enter orders electronically into the
network via a custom computer terminal, and the ECN will then automatically
match and execute contra-side orders. If no match is identified, then an ECN
order can be posted externally on NASDAQ as soon as it becomes the best price.
This arrangement allows ECNs to ‘function as a hybrid between a broker for
counterparties, a broker-dealer or market-maker, and an exchange, and their gain
has been at the expense of NASDAQ.’ The early ECNs provided many benefits
over past trading venues—including the reduction in costs and trading errors,
enhancement of operational efficiencies, and other benefits associated with risk
management. Eventually, day-trading firms who originally sought greater market
access to NASDAQ, as well as brokerage firms, began hustling to set up ECNs;
and the growth rate of ECNs has skyrocketed since 1997. The growth of these
ECNs in the late 1990’s led to the wider use of algorithmic trading and eventually
the rise of independent high frequency trading firms.
McGowan, supra note 24, ¶11 (footnotes omitted).
272. The growth of the ECNS and the demise of the traditional commodity and stock
exchange floor operations is described in Markham & Harty, supra note 246, at 865, 897.
273. The NYSE has dropped its role of specialists and supplanted them with “designated
Market Makers” and “Liquidity Providers,” the latter not having market making obligations.
See NYSE Membership, N.Y. STOCK E XCH ., https://www.nyse.com/markets/nyse/
membership [https://perma.cc/LQA5-F3VY] (last visited Sept. 12, 2015).
274. See Wallace Turbeville, Reign of the High-Frequency Trading Robots, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 18, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/
economic-intelligence/2013/10/18/how-high-frequency-trading-is-taking-over-markets [http://
perma.cc/2ERS-RXE3].
275. Floor trading has not ceased entirely and at least one exchange, the London
Metals Exchange, continues to operate as it has in the past. In 2014, that exchange fined
some members for failing to stay seated in their assigned seats during trading session,
blocking the views of other traders. See Francesca Freeman, LME Fines Nine Traders . . .
For Standing Up, WALL ST. J. (July 21, 2014, 8:48AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/
2014/07/21/lme-fines-nine-dealers-for-standing-up/ [http://perma.cc/E3W9-D6YA].
276. Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Exchange Act Release No. 34–
61358, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594, 3607 (proposed Jan. 21, 2010).
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SEC found: “[t]he use of certain strategies by some proprietary firms has,
in many trading centers, largely replaced the role of specialists and market
makers with affirmative and negative [market making] obligations.”277
The SEC noted, however, that those traders did seek to earn “profits . . .
from . . . the spread by buying at the bid and selling at the offer.”278 As the
SEC further noted:
Highly automated exchange systems and liquidity rebates have helped establish
a business model for a new type of professional liquidity provider that is distinct
from the more traditional exchange specialist and over-the-counter (‘OTC’)
market maker. In particular, proprietary trading firms and the proprietary trading
desks of multi-service broker-dealers now take advantage of low-latency systems
and liquidity rebates by submitting large numbers of non-marketable orders
(often cancelling a very high percentage of them), which provide liquidity to the
market electronically.279

C. The SEC Responds
The SEC regulated ECNs under its Regulation ATS (Automated Trading
Systems), which was adopted in 1998 and required such trading platforms
to register with the agency as broker-dealers.280 However, traders on such
platforms were not required to so register unless they were making a
market in the securities they were trading.281
SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, Jr. also contended that electronic trading
should be centralized in a manner that would allow the public display of

277. Id. See also, Scott S. Powell & Rui Gong, Wall Street’s New Race Toward
Danger, BARRON’S (Mar. 8, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://online.barrons.com/articles/SB12
6783128753256821 [http://perma.cc/6Y56-RLY5] (“[U]nlike registered broker-dealers,
many HFT players aren’t regulated or committed to the capital requirements toward
market making in particular stocks.”).
278. Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, 75 Fed. Reg. at 3607.
279. Id. at 3599.
280. 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.300–303. See Markham & Harty, supra note 246, at 911–12
(describing the scope and background of Regulation ATS).
281. Broker-dealer registration has not been required for “traders” and “investors”
who are trading for their own accounts even though their trading is a part of their regular
business and even if their trading is a highly active and for speculative purposes. See
generally 6 LOUIS LOSS, ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 514 (4th ed. 2011) (describing
the distinction between a dealer that is required to register as a dealer and a trader). Among
the HFTs not required to register were hedge funds and proprietary trading operations
dealing for the trader’s own account. See Concept Release on Equity Market Structure,
75 Fed. Reg. at 3606; Hedge Funds, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.
gov/answers/hedge.htm [http://perma.cc/Z9S5-5EHK] (last modified Dec. 4, 2012).
However, in In OX Trading, LLC, [2013–2014 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
¶¶ 80,405–80,406 (Oct. 22, 2013), the SEC found by consent that a firm was required to
be registered as a dealer under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 because it was acting
as a “liquidity provider” on the Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc. (CBOE).
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orders to all market participants.282 Concerns were also raised over the
fragmentation of the marketplace due to the numerous ECNs then operating.
Those concerns led to new regulations that were promulgated under
authority included in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in 1975, which
authorized the SEC to work toward a single marketplace for trading
securities, that is, a “National Market System” (NMS).283 Before the growth
of electronic trading, the SEC had taken some timid steps toward such a
system.284 However, concerns over electronic trading set the SEC on a
course that set the stage for the now ongoing concerns over HFTs.
In 2005, the SEC adopted Regulation NMS that created a complex set
of order priority and disclosure rules that were intended to level the
electronic trading playing field.285 As one source notes:
The SEC adopted a system that put the premium on speed in execution at a
specific price, without considering the effect it would have upon the balance
between market professionals’ duties and responsibilities to customers and the
effects on the market in general. Regulation NMS essentially shifted the duties

282. See SEC Takes Aim at Nasdaq Trading: Rules Are Proposed To End Practices
by Some Dealers that Are Unfair to Small Investors, L.A. T IMES (Oct. 1, 1995),
http://articles.latimes.com/1995-10-01/opinion/op-54424_1_small-investor [http://perma.
cc/74Z6-UXN7].
283. The concept of a central market system began with a letter from the SEC to
Congress in 1971, in which the SEC stated that “a major goal and ideal of the securities
markets” was the “creation of a strong central market system for securities of national
importance in which all buying and selling interest in these securities could participate and
be represented under a competitive regime.” INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS STUDY, REPORT OF
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. DOC. NO. 64, at xxiv (1st Sess. 1971).
The 1971 Report by William Martin, supra note 260. A SEC Statement in 1972 on
the future structure of the securities markets, and a SEC statement in 1973 on the structure
of a central market system laid the groundwork for legislation enacted in 1975 that directed
the SEC to work toward a “national market system.” See MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note
216, § 2:16 (describing that legislation). The statutory language chose to term this new
market structure as a national market system instead of a central market system. See BRUCHEY,
supra note 154, at 61–62. It may have been that the lack of success with a central market
system in the Soviet Union rendered that term politically suspect.
284. For a long time, a centerpiece of this new national market system was the
Consolidated Last-Sale Reporting System, a.k.a., known as the “Consolidated Tape,” that
began in 1975. BRUCHEY, supra note 154, at 65. It reported all last sales on the NYSE,
the American Stock Exchange and various regional exchanges. Id. The SEC also required
the development of an Intermarket Trading System (ITS) that linked exchanges trading
the same stocks and required those stocks to executed at the best price available on any
exchange within the ITS. WRIGHT, supra note 133, at 61.
285. SEC Adopts Regulation NMS and Provisions Regarding Investment Advisers
Act of 1940, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Apr. 7, 2005), https://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2005-48.htm [https://perma.cc/LU2V-CBJN].
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from the specialists and market makers to the traders themselves by imposing
rules that required brokers to execute orders in the fastest manner possible, prompting
brokerage firms and exchanges to interconnect and develop sophisticated computer
systems to route trades in a maze-like fashion.286

Regulation NMS sought to assure that customers trading on exchanges
and other market centers received the best available price for their securities
on any market where the securities are traded.287 Regulation NMS required
broker-dealers to execute customer orders at the “national best bid or
offer” (NBBO).288 Another “improvement” in the NMS envisioned by the
SEC was the “decimalization” of stock market quotes. This meant that
stocks could be traded by using quotations with a spread as small as a
penny versus the historical minimum of minimum quote size of one-eighth
of a dollar.289 This change initially had the effect of allowing specialists and
markets to widen their spreads. However, as electronic competition grew
spreads were narrowed by amounts lower than the traditional eighths.
This had the effect of undercutting market maker profits and discouraging
them from making commitments for two sided continuous markets.
As the SEC noted in 2008, electronic trading “has reduced the advantages
once enjoyed by Floor brokers and specialists.” The NYSE also claimed
that “the informational advantage has shifted ‘upstairs’ where orders are
now first ‘shopped’ within a firm and then to others before being sent to
the floor for execution . . . .”290

286. Bradley J. Bondi, Memo to Michael Lewis: The Excesses of High-Speed
Trading Are a Direct Result of SEC Micromanagement, FORBES (Apr. 29, 2014, 7:46 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/04/29/memo-to-michael-lewis-the-excesses-ofhigh-speed-trading-are-a-direct-result-of-sec-micromanagement/ [http://perma.cc/SBY5
Q3MA].
287. See Background on Larger Tick Sizes for Mid Cap Stocks, MOD. MKT. INITIATIVE
(Feb. 3, 2014), http://modernmarketsinitiative.org/background-larger-tick-sizes-mid-cap
stocks/ [http://perma.cc/9SA4-LR4U].
288. See SEC, Regulation NMS, Release No. 34-51808, 298–99 (June 9, 2005),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-51808.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q794-8HRX] (adopting
Regulation NMS).
289. Trading in “eighths” was a historical carryover of the peso that was widely
circulated in America before the Civil War. That coinage was broken down into eights,
and gave rise to the term two bits which was equal to a quarter. Spanish Dollar, http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spanish_dollar [http://perma.cc/6B4Y-6G8R] (last modified Aug.
14, 2015).
290. Self-Regulatory Organizations; New York Stock Exchange LLC; Notice of
Filing of Amendment Nos. 2 and 3 and Order Granting Accelerated Approval to a Proposed
Rule Change, as Modified by Amendment Nos. 1, 2, and 3, To Create a New NYSE
Market Model, with Certain Components to Operate as a One-Year Pilot, That Would
Alter NYSE’s Priority and Parity Rules, Phase Out Specialists by Creating a Designated
Market Maker, and Provide Market Participants with Additional Abilities to Post Hidden
Liquidity, Exchange Act Release No. 34-58845, 73 Fed. Reg. 64,379–80 (proposed Oct.
24, 2008) (footnote omitted).
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In response to concerns over HFTs, the SEC issued a market a concept
release (Market Concept Release) in January 2010.291 It sought comment
on whether and how HFTs should be defined and regulated.292 The SEC
noted that HFTs were interacting with other investors in various ways, but
deferred action on regulating any particular type of trade.293 Instead, the
Market Concept Release launched a broad based review by the SEC of the
current equity market structure.294 The SEC sought to determine whether
its rules had kept pace with the growth of electronic trading, including the
role of flash orders and other HFT practices.295 That review is still underway
as of the date of this writing.
HFTs were allowed for a time to have “naked” or “sponsored” access
to market centers, allowing them direct access to those markets where they
interfaced with customer orders. This naked access allowed unregistered
high-frequency traders to access an exchange’s trading facilities without
broker-dealer intermediation or supervision.296 The SEC imposed risk
291. Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Exchange Act Release No. 34–
61358, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594, 3606 (proposed Jan. 21, 2010).
292. Id. at 3594.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. As the SEC noted:
Over the past decade, the proliferation of sophisticated, high-speed trading
technology has changed the way broker-dealers trade for their own accounts and
as agent for their customers. In addition, customers—particularly sophisticated
institutions—have themselves begun using technological tools to place orders
and trade on markets with little or no substantive intermediation by their brokerdealers. This, in turn, has given rise to the increased use and reliance on ‘direct
market access’ or ‘sponsored access’ arrangements. Under these arrangements, the
broker-dealer allows its customer—whether an institution such as a hedge fund,
mutual fund, bank or insurance company, an individual, or another broker
dealer—to use the broker-dealer’s market participant identifier (‘MPID’) or
other mechanism for the purposes of electronically accessing the exchange or
ATS. With ‘direct market access,’ as commonly understood, the customer’s
orders flow through the broker-dealer’s systems before passing into the markets,
while with ‘sponsored access’ the customer’s orders flow directly into the
markets without first passing through the broker-dealer’s systems. In all cases,
however, whether the broker-dealer is trading for its own account, is trading for
customers through more traditionally intermediated brokerage arrangements, or
is allowing customers direct market access or sponsored access, the broker-dealer
with market access is legally responsible for all trading activity that occurs under
its MPID.
Risk Management Controls for Brokers or Dealers with Market Access, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-61379, 75 Fed. Reg. 4007, 4008 (Jan. 26, 2010) (footnotes omitted).
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supervision requirements on the broker-dealers that had offered naked
access.297 That rule effectively curbed naked access.
The SEC Market Concept Release also considered concerns over dark
pools. The SEC noted that, “[i]n general, dark pools offer trading services
to institutional investors and others that seek to execute large trading
interest in a manner that will minimize the movement of prices against the
trading interest and thereby reduce trading costs.”298 There were, however,
inequities that resulted from these competing trading venues. For example,
traders may be able to have their orders filled on a dark pool, “while those
on publicly displayed markets go unfilled, even though dark pools use the
information from publicly displayed markets to price the dark pool
transactions.”299
This disparity is compounded when dark pools share trading information
with other dark pools, allowing them to “function like private networks
that exclude the public investor.”300 The SEC proposed rules to limit such
exclusions by dark pools but has not acted to date on those proposals.301
The SEC created a large trader reporting system that required large traders
to register with the SEC.302 It also began enforcing its trade reporting
requirements for HFTs.303
297.
298.
299.

See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-5 (2014).
Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, 75 Fed. Reg. at 3599.
Fact Sheet: Strengthening the Regulation of Dark Pools, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-223-fs.htm [http://perma.cc/ K2K8
YSVR] (last modified Oct. 23, 2009).
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id. FINRA has proposed a rule that would require developers of computer
algorithms for HFTs to register with FINRA. The SEC then proposed removing an
exemption from broker-dealer registration for HFTs, which will require them to register
with FINRA. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’nSEC Proposes Rule to Require
Broker-Dealers Active in Off-Exchange Market to Become Members of National Securities
Association (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-48.html
[http://perma.cc/YJ5Q-FUKD]. FINRA also proposed additional trade reporting requirements
for dark pools. Sarah N. Lynch, Wall Street Regulator Unveils Proposals for Dark Pools,
Bond Markets, REUTERS (Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/19/us
financial-regulations-finrarules-idUSKBN0HE25G20140919 [http://perma.cc/Z4SJ-FRUT].
FINRA has additionally provided guidance on the supervision of HFTS to assure their
integrity and compliance with trading abuses such as spoofing and “ momentum-ignition”
strategies. Phyllis Diamond, FINRA to Provide Guidance on Supervising Algo Strategies,
Systems, 46 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 2068 (Oct. 27, 2014).
303. Scottrade, Inc., [2014-2014 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 80,468
(S.E.C. 2014), the SEC found by consent that the respondent had failed to file accurate
blue sheet information. The SEC noted that:
Section 17 of the Exchange Act imposes on broker-dealers recordkeeping
requirements that are essential to the Commission’s ability to enforce the federal
securities laws and to protect investors. To ensure the continued effectiveness
of the Commission’s enforcement and regulatory programs, broker-dealers must
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The SEC additionally proposed and adopted a new Regulation SCI
(Systems Compliance and Integrity) to force electronic trading platforms
to enhance their programs for preventing system crashes.304 The SEC also
began more closely monitoring electronic trading platforms.305
D. Futures Markets and Electronic Trading Concerns
Like the stock markets, the futures markets had resisted automation, but
automation soon superseded traditional floor operations and introduced
the HFT to those markets.306 Like the SEC, the CFTC issued a broad
concept release seeking comment on regulations needed to prevent market
disruptions by automated trading systems as the result of order errors or
computer glitches.307 The CFTC concept release also sought to create a
regulatory structure for electronic trading platforms and HFTs.308 Among
comply with, among other things: Rule 17a-25, requiring that broker-dealers
submit electronically securities transaction information upon request by the
Commission’s staff; Rule 17a-4(j), requiring broker-dealers to furnish promptly
true, complete, and current copies of those records upon request by the Commission’s
staff; and Rule 17a-4(f)(3)(v), requiring broker-dealers to have an audit system
that provides for accountability regarding the inputting of records required to be
maintained and preserved.
Id. at 81,307.
304. See Scott Patterson, SEC Delays Action on Wall Street Safeguards, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 8, 2014 (describing this proposed regulation); Scott Patterson, SEC Approves New
Rule to Address Computer Risks, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 2014 (describing adoption of rule).
The industry was also stepping up its monitoring of HFT trading. JPMorgan Chase
announced on July 21, 2014 that it was creating a unit of some 150 employees to monitor
electronic trading that might affect its business and to advise clients trading on electronic
trading platforms. Emily Glazer, Global Finance: J.P. Morgan Puts Electronic Trading in
the Spotlight, WALL ST. J., July 22, 2014, at C3.
305. For example, in New York Stock Exchange LLC, [2014 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 80,615 (2014), the SEC found by consent that an exchange and its
affiliates had implemented rules that created a new or modified business practice without
approval by the SEC. This included providing co-location services, failing to execute mid
point passive liquidity orders in an approved manner, and improperly distributing closing
order imbalance information. Id. ¶¶ 81,886–88.
306. See Markham & Harty, supra note 246, at 865 (describing that resistance and
transformation).
307. Risk Controls and System Safeguards, supra note 5, at 56,542.
308. The CFTC has described the interrelated roles of electronic trading platforms
and automated trading systems as follows:
Automated trading environments have developed in tandem with automated systems
for both the generation and execution of orders. Systems related to the generation
of orders (automated trading systems or ATSs) operate at the beginning of the
order and trade lifecycle; they reflect a set of rules or instructions (an algorithm)
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other things, the CFTC concept release noted, with respect to the development
of automated trading systems (ATS), that:
In addition to greater automation and decreased latency, derivatives markets are
increasingly characterized by a high degree of interconnection. ATSs and algorithms
deployed to trade particular products often interact directly and indirectly with
ATSs and algorithms active in other markets and jurisdictions. Increased
interconnectedness is facilitated by electronic access to real-time pricing information,
automated order execution, and some standardization in communication protocols at
various trading platforms. ATSs can quickly execute strategies across multiple
markets within very short periods of time. Often, cross-market activity is driven
by latent arbitrage opportunities and faster access to multiple markets has led to
a proliferation of strategies that seek to identify and trade on the basis of these
relationships.309

The CFTC adopted some regulations to deal with the risks posed by this
new trading environment. It required futures commission merchants
(FCMs), swap dealers, and major swap participants that are clearing members
of an exchange to establish automated pre-order risk-based limits on position
and order size and margin requirements for all proprietary and customer
accounts.310 Among other things, the CFTC also considered whether to
require registration of HFTs and identification of their algorithms so that the
agency could monitor them for possible disruptive practices or market
threats.311
E. Trading Abuses: “Spoofing” and “Layering”
A by-product of HFTs is a number of trading abuses, such as “spoofing,”
that seek to mislead other traders by posting orders that are not intended

and related computer systems used to automate the execution of a trading strategy.
ATSs may operate as automated execution programs designed to minimize the
price impact of large orders; achieve a benchmarked price (e.g., volume-weighted
average price and time-weighted average price algorithms); or otherwise execute
instructions traditionally provided by a human agent. They may be employed
by a range of market participants, with varying degrees of sophistication, for
both proprietary and customer trading. For example, buy-side firms (such as
mutual funds and pension funds) may use automated systems and execution
algorithms to “shred” one or more large orders (called parent order) into a series
of smaller trades (child orders) to be executed over time. Such systems can include
additional algorithms to micro-manage the size, frequency and timing (often
randomized) of child orders. In addition to automated execution, ATSs may also
operate market-making programs; opportunistic, cross-asset and cross-market arbitrage
programs; and a number of other strategies.
Id. at 56,544.
309. Id. at 56,546–47 (footnotes omitted).
310. 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.73, 23.609 (2014).
311. Risk Controls and System Safeguards, supra note 5, at 56,559–61.
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to be executed.312 This is not a new practice. In addition to using courier
pigeons to gain advance information, Nathan Rothschild first entered sell
orders when he wanted to purchase a large quantity of stock. The sell
orders gave rise to rumors that he was selling and Rothschild would then
acquire his long position at cheaper prices.313 Before the Civil War,
speculators engaged in what was then called a “scoop” game or “partridge”
scheme in which they enter orders that made it appear that the market was
weakening. Those orders would lure short sellers into the market and they
would be trapped by orders that were executed at increasing prices.314
During that era, Jacob Little was able to deceive other traders by
announcing it would he would not sell a certain stock below $90.315 He
then began selling the stock secretly at a lower price.316 Such practices
carried over into this century.317
Electronic spoofing may take several forms. Initially, it was a fraud
scheme that falsified the source of emails in order to give the appearance
that a company had announced news that would affect its stock price. This
allowed the perpetrator of the scheme to trade in advance of that
movement. 318 This term later also applied to trading schemes in which
HFT place orders that they intended to cancel before execution in order to
entice other traders into the market.319
Spoofing as a trading technique also has some regulatory history.
Previously called “flash” trades, such orders were cancelled immediately
upon communication or withdrawn if not executed immediately after

312. Bradley Hope, As ‘Spoof’ Trading Persists, Regulators Clamp Down, WALL ST.
J. (Feb. 22, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-spoofing-traders-dupe-markets
1424662202 [http://perma.cc/4UYC-RZNF].
313.
See JOHN FRANCIS, CHRONICLES AND CHARACTERS OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE
303–04 (1844).
314. 1 MARKHAM, supra note 83, at 162 (describing these schemes).
315. Id. at 161.
316. Id.
317. See TOM BARBASH, ON TOP OF THE WORLD: CANTOR FITZGERALD, HOWARD
LUTNICK & 9/11, at 92–93 (2003) (describing such practices by Merrill Lynch in the U.S.
Treasury market). See also JERRY W. MARKHAM, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE HISTORY
OF FINANCIAL MARKET MANIPULATION, 388–89 (2014) (describing other such trading
practices).
318. See SEC v. Dorozkho, 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009) (addressing such a scheme).
See also MARKHAM, supra note 317, at 334–35 (further describing such schemes).
319. See MARKHAM, supra note 317, at 334–35 (describing the background of spoofing
concerns).
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communication.320 Many criticized flash trades.321 However, one of the
SEC National Market System (NMS) rules, which allowed exchanges to
exclude flash orders from consolidated quotation data disclosures, specifically
authorized such practices.322 The SEC found that, “[f]or those seeking
liquidity, the flash mechanism may attract additional liquidity from market
participants who are not willing to display their trading interest publicly.”323
The SEC did express concern that such trading could be abusive and
provide an advantage to professional traders over smaller traders, but deferred
a decision to ban such orders entirely because of their potential value to
the market.324
The SEC’s concerns over the value of flash orders was justified. For
example, traders might enter orders to “ping” the market like a submarine
seeking out possible dangers or target opportunities. Pinging appears to
be a legitimate practice that should be allowed for traders, but should flash
orders so large in volume as to overload competing platforms be
allowed?325 Instead of trying to define the difference between good and
bad flash trades, the SEC began to regulate such trading through enforcement
actions. Those actions attacked spoofing trades designed to increase the
national best and offer (NBBO) by not displaying customer orders at
prices that were better than a market maker’s NBBO posts. This practice
was charged as being in violation of SEC rules on limit order displays.326
The SEC also began charging “layering” as an improper trading practice.
Layering appears to be simply a more robust form of flash trades, but
which the SEC views to be fraudulent. The SEC has stated that:
In general, layering occurs when a trader creates a false appearance of market
activity by entering multiple non-bona fide orders on one side of the market, at
generally increasing (or decreasing) prices, in order to move that stock’s price in

320. Elimination of Flash Order Exception from Rule 602 of Regulation NMS,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-60684, 74 Fed. Reg. 48,632 (Sept. 23, 2009).
321. See “Flash” Trading Controversy in U.S. Raises Issue of Front-Running,
REUTERS (Aug. 7, 2009), http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-forum/2009/08/07/
flash-trading-controversy-in-us-raises-issue-of-front-running/ [http://perma.cc/WQ2P-CH42]
(describing this controversy).
322. 17 C.F.R. § 242.602(a)(1)(i)(A) (2014).
323. Elimination of Flash Order Exception from Rule 602 of Regulation NMS, 74
Fed. Reg. at 48638.
324. Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, supra note 3, at 3594.
325. See Gregory Scopino, The Questionable Legality of High-Speed “Pinging” and
“Front Running” in the Futures Markets, 47 CONN. L. REV. 609 (2015) (questioning the
role of pinging).
326. In re Frazee, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8209, 2003 WL 1222734 (S.E.C.
Mar. 18, 2003).
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a direction where the trader intends to induce others to buy (or sell) at a price
altered by the non-bona fide orders.327

HFTs were also criticized for using complex orders to game other
aspects of the SEC’s NMS. One particularly unwieldy aspect of SEC
Regulation NMS is its prohibition against quoting a “locked” market in
which the buy and sell quotes are the same. In theory, the trades should
cross and execute but do not because one or the other party may not want
to pay the exchange fee associated with the execution.328 That prohibition
gave rise to various trading strategies to avoid the effect of that locked
market prohibition, including complex “hide not slide” orders that were
criticized in the press.329 The hide-not-slide orders were designed to give
priority to undisplayed orders when the market unlocked.330 The SEC has
also sought sanctions where a trading platform uses customer information
for its own trading advantage.331

327. In re Biremis Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 34-68456, 2012 WL 6587520
(S.E.C. Dec. 18, 2012). The SEC has also described layering as follows:
Layering concerns the use of non-bona fide orders, or orders that the trader does
not intend to have executed, to induce others to buy or sell the security at a price
not representative of actual supply and demand. More specifically, a trader
places a buy (or sell) order that is intended to be executed, and then immediately
enters numerous non-bona fide sell (or buy) orders for the purpose of attracting
interest to the bona fide order. These non-bona fide orders are not intended to
be executed. The nature of these orders is to induce, or trick, other market
participants to execute against the initial, bona fide order. Immediately after the
execution against the bona fide order, the trader cancels the open, non-bona fide
orders, and repeats this strategy on the opposite side of the market to close out
the position.
Hold Brothers On-Line Investment Services, LLC, 2012 LEXIS 3029 (S.E.C. Sept. 25,
2012).
328. Cameron Smith, Stock Investors Can Handle the Truth, WALL ST. J., June 3,
2014, at A11.
329. See Scott Patterson & Jenny Strasburg, For Superfast Stock Traders, A Way to
Jump Ahead in Line, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2012, at A1 (describing these orders).
330. See id. (describing this practice).
331. A Citigroup, Inc. affiliate agreed to pay $5 million to settle SEC charges that it
failed to protect the confidential information of customers trading on its ECN, LavaFlow
Inc. That information involved non-displayed orders and was given to a Citigroup affiliate
for its trading. Michael Calia, Citigroup Unit Pays Record Fine Over Alternative Trading
System, WALL ST. J., July 25, 2014, at B5. See also LavaFlow, Inc., [2014 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 80,652 (2014). In Liquidnet, Inc., [2014 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 80,626 (2014), the SEC by consent sanctioned a dark
pool that was registered as an ATS for sharing confidential information about customer
trading with a business unit outside the dark pool.
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Mary Jo White, the SEC Chair, announced in June 2014 that she had
directed the SEC staff to formulate rules that would identify and prohibit
disruptive HFT trading strategies during volatile market conditions. She
stated that the SEC “should not roll back the technology clock or prohibit
algorithmic trading,” but that it had to assess “the extent to which specific
elements of the computer-driven trading environment may be working
against investors rather than for them.”332 White also questioned, “whether
the increasingly expensive search for speed has passed the point of
diminishing returns.”333 She stated that the SEC would also be examining
“mechanisms designed to minimize speed advantages.”334 White further
indicated the SEC might impose affirmative market making obligations
on HFTs, as had been done in the past to offset the time and place advantages
of market makers and specialists on the NYSE and Nasdaq.335
Like the SEC, the CFTC encountered concerns over HFT trading practices.
Section 747 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank) allowed the CFTC to attack “spoofing”
—bidding or offering with the intent to cancel the bid or offer before
execution.336 Section 747 also allowed the CFTC to attack other “disruptive”
trading practices, such as violating the bids and offers of other traders and
“banging the close.”337

332. Mary Jo White, Enhancing Our Equity Market Structure, Address Before
Sandler O’Neill & Partners, L.P. Global Exchange and Brokerage Conference New York,
N.Y. (June 5, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370542004312#.
VD_QakvP4pE [http://perma.cc/6JMD-CH6N].
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. 7 U.S.C. § 6(c) (2012) (which amended Section 4c of the Commodity Exchange
Act of 1936 (CEA)). Section 4c had previously prohibited certain improper trading
practices such as “wash” sales, “accommodation” trades and “fictitious” trades. See 13
JERRY W. MARKHAM, COMMODITIES REGULATION: FRAUD, MANIPULATION & OTHER
CLAIMS, ch. 14 (2014) (describing those practices). See also MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra
note 216, § 9:17.80 (describing spoofing).
337. 7 U.S.C. § 6(c). Banging the close involves manipulating the closing price of
a futures or options contract in order to reduce margin requirements or to affect the price
of a cash market position. See DiPlacido v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 364 F.
App’x. 657 (2d Cir. 2009) (a pre-Dodd-Frank case attacking such practices as
manipulation). The SEC and the Justice Department have also brought cases charging
violations in connection with efforts to manipulate closing prices. See MARKHAM, supra
note 317, at 333–34 (describing those cases). See also, e.g., Athena Capital Research, LLC,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-73369, 2014 WL 5282074 (Oct. 16, 2014) (settlement of
banging the close case); Sarah N. Lynch, New York High-Speed Trading Firm Settles SEC
Charges Over Manipulation, REUTERS (Oct. 16, 2014, 4:46PM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2014/10/16/us-sec-highspeed-idUSKCN0I52E620141016 [http://perma.cc/PH4E-Z75W]
(describing how a HFT trader settled with the SEC over alleged manipulation involving closing
prices).
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The CFTC subsequently issued an interpretation of the scope of the
prohibition in Section 747 of Dodd-Frank. Among other things, that
interpretation stated its prohibitions apply to any trading that involves
buying at a price higher than the lowest available price or selling at a price
lower than the highest available price.338 The CFTC also brought spoofing
charges against traders and one trader was indicted for such activity after
settling with the CFTC.339
VI. INFORMATION IS A COMMODITY
There has been much argument over whether HFTs add value to the
market by enhancing liquidity.340 However, that debate seems bit pointless
338. Antidisruptive Practices Authority, 78 Fed. Reg. 31,890 (May 28, 2013). The
CME Group also adopted a rule prohibiting disruptive trading practices such as quote
stuffing that seeks to overwhelm the quotations of another market participant, disorderly
trading during closing periods, and spoofing. CME Group Files Rule to Prohibit
Disruptive Practices, 46 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1797 (Sept. 15, 2014).
339. Kara Scannell & Gregory Meyer, Trader Faces Criminal Spoofing Charges,
FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 2, 2014. Questions have been raised over whether that spoofing
actually injured anyone other than other HFTs. Matt Levine, Prosecutors Catch a
Spoofing Panther, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Oct. 2, 2014, 5:15PM), http://www.bloomberg
view.com/articles/2014-10-02/prosecutors-catch-a-spoofing-panther [http://perma.cc/E88V
YBD9]. Another trader settled a CFTC manipulation case for $1.56 million, which charged
that the trader repeatedly entered and cancelled orders that he did not plan to have executed
in order to provide the false appearance of liquidity in wheat futures contracts. Broker
Agrees to Pay $1.56M in Manipulation Case, 46 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1969 (Oct.
6, 2014). The commodity exchanges were also bringing numerous spoofing claims against
traders. Gregory Meyer & Kara Scannell, Chicago Prosecutor Gets Tough on ‘Spoofing,’
FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 8, 2014. Still another trader was charged in April 2015 by the
CFTC and the Justice Department with spoofing that contributed to the Flash Crash in
May 2010. Press Release, U.S. Commodity Future Trading Comm’n, CFTC Charges U.K.
Resident Navinder Singh Sarao and His Company Nav Sarao Futures Limited PLC with
Price Manipulation and Spoofing (Apr. 21, 2015), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/Press
Releases/pr7156-15 [http://perma.cc/BKF6-Z6YC].
340. For example, the CBOE has claimed that: “Generally speaking, the evolution
of high frequency trading has helped limit spreads and increase market liquidity—
efficiencies that benefit all market participants.” High Frequency Trading: Progress or
Problem?, CBOE, http://www.cboe.com/AboutCBOE/MediaHub/high-frequency-trading/
views.aspx [http://perma.cc/DTC6-BYPG] (last visited Sept. 12, 2015 ). See, e.g., Markus
Baldauf & Joshua Mollner, The Private Value of Speed: Systematic Advantages of Fast
Liquidity Providers, STANFORD UNIV. ECON. DEP’T, May 29, 2014; Bradley Hope, A HighSpeed Trader Looks To Slow Down Critics, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 15, 2014), http://
online.wsj.com/articles/a-high-speed-trader-looks-to-slow-down-critics-1413318872?mod
=dist_smartbrief [http://perma.cc/5VU7-EXGC]; Matthew O’Brien, Everything You Need
To Know About High Frequency Trading, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 11, 2014), http://www.
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because, as volume figures indicate,341 HFTs are supplanting the traditional
market makers on both the stock and futures exchanges. Criticism of HFT
trading practices that may be abusive are a matter of appropriate regulatory
concern, but that begs the questions of what is abusive and how such
practices should be regulated.
Identification of an abuse is itself problematic, since not every
advantage or stratagem is abusive even if it provides advantage to its user
at the expense of others. Pinging, for example, seems legitimate because
it is merely seeking out trading interest, but when does pinging become
illegal spoofing? Once identified as abusive, prohibited practices could
be spotted by regulatory authorities through their own algorithms.342 That
would add certainty to the market and free traders of guessing what is or
is not permitted.343 In the meantime, the regulators are bringing cases on
an ad hoc basis that adds little to the debate over the proper role and
regulation of HFTs.344
This focus on trading abuses actually masks the real concern of
regulators—HFTs take advantage of asymmetrical access to information
gained by their high-speed trading abilities. This concern has even spawned
proposals to slow down the HFTs and thereby remove their high-speed
advantages. One proposal would label HFTs as “e-specialist brokers” and
handicap those registrants by preventing them from using exchange data
feeds. This would prevent the HFTs from getting a jump on other traders.345
Another approach is to slow everyone down to the same speed. For
example, IEX is a dark pool that uses a 350 micro-second delay for orders
theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/04/everything-you-need-to-know-about-high
frequency-trading/360411/ [http://perma.cc/ZB9X-NYUL]; Lauren Oppenheimer & John
Vahey, The Need For Speed, CAPITAL MKTS. INITIATIVE, 1, 1 (July 2013), http://
content.thirdway.org/publications/722/Third_Way_Report_-_The_Need_For_Speed.pdf
[http://perma.cc/8T3J-BWZN]; Matthew Philips, How The Robots Lost: High Frequency
Trading’s Rise and Fall, BLOOMBERG (June 6, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/
articles/2013-06-06/how-the-robots-lost-high-frequency-tradings-rise-and-fall [http://perma.
cc/BA3Z-7F4N].
341. See supra notes 14–16.
342. FINRA seems to be moving in this direction. FINRA Board OK’s Proposals
on Dark Pools, Algorithmic Trading, Fixed Income Markets, 46 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 1825
(Sept. 22, 2014).
343. See MARKHAM, LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 310, at 334–35 (describing
such an approach). See also Gregory Scopino, Do Automated Trading Systems Dream of
Manipulating the Price of Futures Contracts? Policing Markets for Improper Trading
Practices by Algorithmic Robots, 66 FLA. L. REV. 221, 283–84 (2015) (advocating a
supervisory requirement for firms with HFTs).
344. For example, the SEC trumpeted its prosecution of an HFT over a net capital
violation. See HFT Firm Agrees to Record SEC Fine For Alleged Violations of Net
Capital Rule, 46 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1824 (Sept. 22, 2014).
345. Report: “E-Specialist” Label Can Reduce HFT Issues, 46 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 1775 (Sept. 15, 2014).
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entered into its system for execution in order. That delay seeks to equalize
trading opportunities and preclude the front running of customer orders.346
IEX was also seeking to compete with the dark pools by allowing trading
for free where buy and sell orders match. Other trades on IEX were
assessed a fee of nine cents per 100 shares and there were no maker/taker
payments to encourage liquidity by HFT orders. Broker-dealers would be
given priority over other traders, including HFTs.347
A number of other fixes for HFT trading have been proposed, including
a widening of tick sizes for market quotes. That would be a reversal of a
prior SEC action that reduced tick sizes to a penny from the traditional 1/
16 and 1/8 of a dollar. Moreover, wider spreads are an indication of an
illiquid and inefficient market, so why require inefficiency? The SEC also
considered a requirement that trades be conducted on dark pools only at
prices better than those available on public markets.348
Again, these efforts are directed toward the creation of a level playing
field for all traders. However, as history has shown, traders have always
sought information advantages that will allow them to profit at the expense
of slower competitors. It would seem strange to historians if governments
had prohibited the use of mirrors, smoke signals, or courier pigeons in
trading securities. Similarly, banning fast ships and express coaches would
also be laughable to us today if such action had been taken in order to curb
the advantages of speculators.
This misguided attack on informational advantages is fueled by the
SEC’s fixation on insider trading, which it initially based on a theory that

346. Scott Patterson, Regulator Hired by Upstart Firm, WALL ST. J., June 17, 2014,
at C5. Other proposals for slowing HFTS include minimum order exposure time, batch
auctions in which the exchange will periodically execute orders at price where most bids
and offers match, and a transaction tax that would penalize rapid trading. See SHORTER &
MILLER, supra note 37, at 34–36.
347. Bradley Hope, IEX Plan Aims to Drain ‘Dark Pools’, WALL ST. J., July 7, 2014,
at C1.
348. Andrew Ackerman & Bradley Hope, SEC Set to Spur Exchange Trading, WALL
ST. J., May 27, 2014, at C1. See also Andy Kessler, High-Frequency Trading Needs One
Quick Fix, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2014, at A15 (reporting that one fix for NMS was
suggested as requiring best execution, rather than best price and by increasing decimalization
to minimum five cent spreads). See JEFF CASTURA ET AL., MARKET EFFICIENCY AND
MICROSTRUCTURE EVOLUTION IN U.S. EQUITY MARKETS: A HIGH-FREQUENCY PERSPECTIVE
(2010), http://finlin.wharton.upenn.edu/department/Seminar/micro/Litzenberger_transient
_vol5_2010.pdf [http://perma.cc/GH8B-UZYZ] (discussing role of HFTs in narrowing
spreads).
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unequal access to information that is used to trade stocks is fraudulent.349
However, an insider trading charge requires proof of some misappropriation
of information or obtaining or using information in breach of a fiduciary
duty.350 However, HFTs are neither misappropriating information nor
breaching any fiduciary duty. Moreover, the Supreme Court has rejected
the SEC’s claims for equal access to information even in insider trading
cases. The Supreme Court held in Chiarella v. United States351 that “[a]
duty to disclose . . . does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic
market information.”352 “Moreover, neither the Congress nor the [Securities
and Exchange] Commission ever has adopted a parity-of-information
rule. Instead, the problems caused by misuse of market information have
been addressed by detailed and sophisticated regulation that recognizes
when use of market information may not harm operation of the securities
markets.”353 This should signal a focus on rules that attack particular
trades that are fraudulent and not on the facts that one trader is faster than
another is or has better information.
The equal access to information theory has also been solidly rejected in
the futures markets beginning early in the country’s history. In an 1817
decision written by Justice John Marshall in Laidlaw v. Organ, the
349. The equal access to information insider trading theory had been created out of
whole cloth by the SEC in a 1961 consent order. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907
(1961). Such a doctrine had been rejected at common law. See Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186
N.E. 659, 611 (Sup. Mass. 1933). The SEC had not posited such a theory until the 1961
consent decree. See MARKHAM, supra note 317, at 138 (describing this development). The
SEC then began using insider trading cases as the centerpiece of its enforcement efforts. See,
e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 839–41 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied
sub nom., Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
350. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 667 (1987).
351. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 223 (1980).
352. Id. at 235.
353. Id. at 233. See also, Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 651, 659–60 (1983) (further
circumscribing the SEC’s equal access to information theory). In United States v.
Finnerty, 533 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2008), the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the
defendant’s convictions for interpositioning or front running of customer trades because
there was “no evidence that Finnerty conveyed an impression that was misleading, whether
or not it could have a bearing on a victim’s investment decision in connection with a
security.” Id. at 149. The Court further stated that:
It may be that Finnerty unfairly profited from superior information. But “not
every instance of financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity under §
10(b).” Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232, 100 S. Ct. 1108, 63 L. Ed.
2d 348 (1980). And characterizing Finnerty’s conduct as “self-evidently deceptive”
is conclusory; there must be some proof of manipulation or a false statement,
breach of a duty to disclose, or deceptive communicative conduct. “Section
10(b) is aptly described as a catchall provision, but what it catches must be
fraud.”
Id. at 234–35.
353. Id. at 150.
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Supreme Court held that a purchaser of tobacco had no duty to disclose to
the seller the buyer’s prior non-public knowledge of the signing of the
Treaty of Ghent.354 Tobacco prices increased substantially when the
existence of the treaty became publicly known.355
Congress amended the CEA in 2008 to adopt the approach taken in
Laidlaw v. Organ.356 Congress then added a proviso to the anti-fraud
provisions of Section 4b of the CEA357 that states its prohibitions do not
require disclosure of:
nonpublic information that may be material to the market price, rate, or level of
the commodity or transaction, except as necessary to make any statement made
to the other person in or in connection with the transaction not misleading in any
material respect.358

Section 753 of the Dodd-Frank Act added language to the CEA that is
modeled after Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934359 and
used by the SEC for its insider trader cases.360 However, Section 753 of
Dodd-Frank also adopted the language from the 2008 legislation that
proscribes the CFTC from adopting regulations that would include insider
trading concepts such as those advocated by the SEC.361
Section 753 of Dodd-Frank prohibits any “manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance” in violation of CFTC rules adopted within one year
of the enactment of Dodd-Frank.362 The CFTC promulgated Rule 180.1
354. Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. 178, 195 (1817).
355. In rejecting that claim, Justice Marshall’s opinion tracked that of the proviso
added to Section 4b of the CEA. He stated:
The question in this case is, whether the intelligence of extrinsic circumstances,
which might influence the price of the commodity, and which was exclusively
within the knowledge of the vendee, ought to have been communicated by him
to the vendor? The court is of the opinion that he was not bound to communicate
it. It would be difficult to circumscribe the contrary doctrine within proper
limits, where the means of intelligence are equally accessible to both parties.
But at the same time, each party must take care not to say or do anything tending
to impose upon the other.
Id. at 195.
356. Id.; 7 U.S.C. § 6b(b) (2012).
357. 7 U.S.C. § 6b (2012).
358. 7 U.S.C. § 6b(b) (2012).
359. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
360. Section 753 of Dodd-Frank also added a new special provision price manipulations
through “false reporting.” Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
§ 753.
361. Id.
362. Id.
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to implement that provision.363 In doing so, the CFTC refused to adopt a
broad SEC insider trading prohibition because of the Laidlaw like
language in Section 753 of the Dodd-Frank Act. The CFTC stated that it
is not a violation Rule 180.1 “to withhold information that a market
participant lawfully possesses about market conditions . . . either in an
anonymous market setting or in bilateral negotiations . . . .”364 The CFTC
thus recognized “that unlike securities markets, derivatives markets have
long operated in a way that allows for market participants to trade on the
basis of lawfully obtained material nonpublic information.365 The CEA’s
approach to asymmetrical access to information should apply equally to
informational advantages from high-speed trading.
There are sound reasons why information should not be regulated in the
absence of fraud. Information is a commodity that has value and for which
its holder deserves payment. This simple and basic concept is found
everywhere in markets and in daily commerce. Consider the purchase of
a newspaper bought by a reader to obtain the information it contains. We
all happily pay our doctor bills to obtain the information provided by the
doctor’s diagnosis. Teachers are paid to disseminate information, as are
store clerks, computer programmers and preachers. So why should
special knowledge obtained by a trader be any different? Traders holding
asymmetrical information or speed advantages should be rewarded for
their effort and not punished.
In any event, there is the practical problem that possession of information
is by its very nature asymmetrical. It is not possible for everyone to be
informed of everything all the time. Some traders will always have a
possession or speed advantage over other traders. Some traders will gain
access to market moving information before others. Indeed, and not a little
ironically, HFTs were using their ability to access the SEC’s public
company filings faster than other traders through direct feeds sold by the
SEC and then trade on that information before others receiving the information
on the Internet could act.366 This gave HFTs an advantage of as much as
ten seconds.367

363. 17 C.F.R. § 180.1 (2014).
364. CFTC, Prohibition on Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 76 Fed. Reg.
41,398, 41,402 (July 14, 2011).
365. Id. at 41,403.
366. Ryan Tracey & Scott Patterson, Fast Traders are Getting Data from SEC
Seconds Early, WALL ST. J., (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/fast-traders-are
getting-data-from-sec-seconds-early-1414539997 [http://perma.cc/675T-4N34].
367. Id. Dave Michaels, Senators Urge SEC to Fix Unequal Access to Market Data,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-11-03/senators-urgesec-s-white-to-fix-unequal-access-to-market-data.html [http://perma.cc/ZT5H-LF65].
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Market moving information should be given equal dignity with any
other article of commerce. This means, for example, that exchanges should
be able to charge access fees for the information they provide without
regulation by a fee setting agency like the SEC.368 If exchanges want to
charge higher fees for better access, then they should be allowed to do so.
Exchanges exist because of the information they disseminate, and they
should be compensated for that service. That same logic applies to exchange
co-location services for which the exchanges charge fees.369
Similarly, exchange incentive fees that vary for “makers” of orders and
those charged to “takers” of orders, which have engendered much criticism,
should also be left to the trading platforms to set. Those incentives are
intended to encourage liquidity and are desirable and provide information
that is valuable to the market. After all, the specialists and Nasdaq market
makers had long profited from the spread between purchase and sale
orders. They were applauded for doing so because of the liquidity they
provided to the market. HFTS are no less entitled to rewards for providing
liquidity.
Further, as the SEC has noted, “[i]nvestors need not . . . always be
price-takers and accept whatever prices the other side of the market is
offering at the moment. They can participate in price competition by

368. In NetCoalition v. SEC, 715 F.3d 342 344, 354 (D.C. Cir. 2013), the D.C.
Circuit dismissed a case seeking to require the SEC to suspend the fee setting rules of
exchanges for the acquisition of proprietary market data. The court noted that in an earlier
decision it had set aside the SEC’s approval of an exchange rule because of faulty
reasoning. Id. However, the Dodd-Frank Act subsequently removed the requirement that
the SEC approve such fees.
369. Interestingly, the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA),
the primary trade organization representing the broker-dealer community is advocating the
elimination or sharp reduction of exchange access fees. SIFMA is also urging the
imposition of a requirement that all users of market data have access to data at the same
time. See SIFMA Publishes Recommendations for Enhancing Fairness, Stability, and
Transparency in US Equity Markets, SIFMA (July 14, 2014), http://www.sifma.org/
newsroom/2014/sifma-publishes-recommendations-for-enhancing-fairness-stability-and
transparency-in-us-equity-markets/ [http://perma.cc/F3AT-NUGP]. However, a district
court dismissed state law claims by a subscriber to an exchange information feed that
received information only after the preferred access given to HFTs. The court held that
the state law claims were preempted because the SEC had examined this area and
concluded that such preference was permissible. The court further held that, even if not
preempted, there was no justiciable claim under state law. Lanier v. BATS Exchange,
Inc., 2015 WL 191446 (S.D.N.Y.).
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submitting limit orders to obtain better prices than the market is offering.”370
Ironically, the SEC further observed that:
Whatever their particular trading strategy, investors that participate in price
competition by offering immediate liquidity in a security are seeking primarily to
interact with investor order flow on the other side of the market. Assuring an
opportunity for this type of direct interaction between investors without the
intervention of a dealer is one of the principal objectives of the national market
system.371

The HFTs in all events do not need to be slowed down. This is an era
of computers and advocating a return to ink quills and foolscap is nonsense.
The HFT is simply another step that began with courier pigeons and smoke
signals and now is progressing to microwaves. One can only wonder what
the next generation will bring to the long running effort to gain trading
advantage by faster information media.
VII. CONCLUSION
The use of high-speed methods for the transmittal of information in
order to obtain an edge on trading over other traders is a practice that is as
old as the markets themselves. From carrier pigeons to laser technology,
time has shown that information is a valuable commodity that traders
naturally use to seek a profit. By doing so, they are transmitting that
information to the market through their trading and provide market
liquidity and better market efficiency.

370. Commission’s Request for Comment on Market Fragmentation Release No.
34–42450 65 Fed. Reg. 10577, 10581 (Feb. 28, 2000). The SEC also noted that:
Another type of implicit transaction cost reflected in the price of a security is
short-term price volatility caused by temporary imbalances in trading interest.
For example, a significant implicit cost for large investors (who often represent
the consolidated investments of many individuals) is the price impact that their
large trades can have on the market. Indeed, disclosure of these large orders can
reduce the likelihood of their being filled. Consequently, large investors often
seek ways to interact with order flow and participate in price competition without
submitting a limit order that would display the full extent of their trading interest
to the market. Among the ways large investors can achieve this objective are:
(1) To have their orders represented on the floor of an exchange market; (2) to
submit their orders to a market center that offers a limit order book with a reserve
size feature; or (3) to use a trading mechanism that permits some form of
“hidden” interest to interact with the other side of the market. A market structure
that facilitates maximum interaction of trading interest can produce price
competition within displayed prices by providing a forum for the representation
of undisclosed orders.
Id. (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
371. Id. at 10581 (footnote omitted).
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